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## IN THIS ISSUE


THE SHAPE OF THINGS 57

EDITORIALS

The Monetary Conference 60
Inside Red China 61

ARTICLES

The War Fronts *by Charles G. Bolté* 62
The Cross of Gold *by I. F. Stone* 63
50 Years Ago in *The Nation* 64
Goodby to Revolution! *by J. Alvarez del Vayo* 65
Have Faith in France *by Joseph Chapiro* 68
Willkie's Choice *by Arnold Beichman* 70
In the Wind 71

POLITICAL WAR

Those Gentle Danes *by Gunnar Leistikow* 72
Behind the Enemy Line *by Argus* 73

BOOKS AND THE ARTS

Notes by the Way *by Margaret Marshall* 74
Deadly Praise *by Keith Hutchison* 74
How to Deal with Japan *by T. A. Bisson* 75
A Memoir of Duffus *by Solomon F. Bloom* 76
The Soviet Economy *by Heinz H. F. Eulau* 77
Laws and Responsibilities *by Albert Guérard* 78
In Brief 81
Films *by James Agee* 81
Music *by B. H. Haggin* 82

LETTERS TO THE EDITORS 83

CROSS-WORD PUZZLE NO. 72 *by Jack Barrett* 84



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# *The Shape of Things*

THE VISIT OF GENERAL DE GAULLE WAS a skilful job of diplomatic engineering. Obviously an agreement between him and the President could not be delayed. The practical problems created by the invasion had to be met in practical political terms; no longer could French claims be dismissed as "irrelevant." The Committee of Liberation is functioning as a government on French soil to the apparent satisfaction of both the people and the Allied High Command. The British have hammered out a series of agreements governing the administration of freed areas similar to those made with Belgium, Holland, and Norway. Mr. Churchill dramatically revealed his dissatisfaction with the American position by begging the Commons not to debate the matter. Obviously the stupid stalemate had to be ended by some maneuver which would save Mr. Roosevelt's face and yet give to the French Committee the substance of its demands. As we go to press, no announcement of the results of General de Gaulle's meetings with the President has been issued. But the emphasis in the press on the friendly nature of the talks and the desire of both men to avoid issues which might impede agreement provide a good clue to the result. General de Gaulle will take back to Algiers the de facto recognition of the government of the United States. It will not be called that. But the sort of working arrangements that have doubtless been arrived at constitute de facto recognition. As for Mr. Roosevelt, he has at last withdrawn from an untenable position, however he may have screened his retreat with diplomatic reservations. For this we must be thankful; but it is an unhappy fact that this country has again been driven by events to adopt a policy that political wisdom dictated from the start.

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MR. CHURCHILL'S STATEMENT ON THE ROBOT bombs makes it clear that London is once again on the front line. The number of deaths among civilians caused by the robots is actually greater than the number of fatalities suffered by British soldiers in Normandy during the same period. While casualties to date are far fewer than they were in the first months of the 1940 blitz, the ceaseless, indiscriminate nature of the attack places a heavier burden on the civilian population than


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the earlier raids inflicted. Spells of bad weather, instead of impeding the robots, actually permit an intensification of the terror. Despite the vast amount of destruction that is undoubtedly being done to civilian property, the robot bomb has as yet to prove of value as a military weapon. The quotations from the Nazi press cited by Argus elsewhere in this issue make it evident that the robots' primary purpose is to demonstrate to the German people that their government is capable of retaliating for the destruction suffered from Allied air raids. Wreaking vengeance upon a civilian population is of course not new to German practice. The original blitz on London was of the same character, and for months after the Nazis had suffered defeat at Leningrad the population of that city was subjected to shelling at least as severe as the robot attacks on London. Leningrad survived, and so will London.

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THE REPLACEMENT OF VON RUNDSTEDT BY von Kluge as Supreme Commander in the west has been interpreted in various ways, but the most plausible explanation is that at this critical moment Hitler does not want to pit against Eisenhower and Montgomery a general he does not entirely trust. On several occasions the cold shrewd judgment of von Rundstedt, who is considered the ablest chieftain of the German army next to Brauchitsch, has been known to conflict with the emotional convictions of the Führer. Even two years ago von Rundstedt was reported to have given up hope of a German victory. But apparently, his replacement involves something more than conflicting temperaments. Reports from neutral countries have implied that the Marshal, who has never been a party man and whose hostility to party control is a matter of common knowledge, had established contact with people who have easy access to Allied commanders. Talk of peace feelers has been in the air, interlarded with references to German generals of the old school. To a nation which "has burned its boats and has nothing more to lose," as Dr. Goebbels put it in his last article in *Das Reich,* a General who had not yet burned his boats and who thought that something could be saved by a timely capitulation was bound to seem an untrustworthy leader of the army in the west. This interpretation is far more credible than the official stories of ill health and the rumors that von Rundstedt was ousted because of his failure to halt the invasion. If it is correct, it would prove that Hitler still has the last say, and it would negate many theories about the comparative strength of the Wehrmacht and the party.

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REPORTS OF THE MASSACRE BY THE NAZIS OF from 1,500,000 to 1,750,000 Jews during the past two years have been received from several apparently authoritative sources. The murders are said to have taken place at two "model extermination camps" at Auschwitz and Birkenau in Upper Silesia, and the information about them, which was obtained from survivors, has been carefully checked by the Very Reverend Paul Vogt, head of the internationally known refugee organization, the *Flüchtlingshifte,* of Zurich. The reports, well documented though they are, seem too terrible for credence. Yet the evidence is overwhelming. Speaking before the House of Commons, Anthony Eden confirmed earlier stories of the deportation of 400,000 Hungarian Jews, of whom 100,000 have already been slain in the Silesian camps. And official Soviet commissions have confirmed similar mass executions of Jews in a number of Russian cities. In many instances the names of the individuals who are directly responsible for these murders are known, and these men will unquestionably be punished as provided in the three-power statement issued last November in Moscow. But these are not crimes for which a few individuals alone are responsible. Blame must also be placed on the German people for tolerating, without visible protest, a government which has gloried in its ruthlessness toward the Jews and other minorities.

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JESSE JONES'S FRONT-PAGE EDITORIAL IN THE Houston *Chronicle* ever so gently chiding Texas anti-fourth-termers was a minimum gesture for a Cabinet officer, a political necessity rather than a sincere expression of loyalty to his chief. "Usually well-informed political gossip" is cited by the New York *Herald Tribune* as the source of the report that Jones was given "anything but gentle treatment" at a recent conference with the President and that he disclaimed any knowledge of the Texas revolt. The disclaimer, like that made by Jones's associate, Will Clayton, is incredible. Jones's nephew, George Butler, is chairman of the Texas State Democratic Executive Committee and a leading figure among the anti-fourth-termers. Lamar Fleming, one of the principal executives of Clayton's cotton concern, was one of the framers of the plan to free Texas electors from their traditional obligation to cast their votes as directed. Clayton, under pressure, at least issued a forthright statement—"I do not approve." But Jones merely said that "on reflection there is good reason to believe that the [Texas State] convention acted in the heat of political controversy." This may be read either as a statement of fact or as a mild rebuke, and is hardly sufficient amends from a Cabinet officer who has been linked to an intrigue against his chief.

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THE JONES-CLAYTON STATEMENTS REFLECT the collapse of the anti-Roosevelt movement in the South, which now hopes only to block Wallace and to prevent the party from matching the Republican planks on FEPC, poll-tax, and anti-lynching legislation. Assorted forces supporting Rayburn, Douglas, Truman, and

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McNutt for second place on the ticket seem to be ganging up on Wallace, and there are reports that the President, while still in favor of the Vice-President's renomination, will not attempt to dictate it. We hope those reports are untrue. The future of the New Deal at home and of international cooperation abroad may rest on a wise choice for Vice-President, and the only wise one we can see in this perspective is Henry Wallace. The Southern anti-New Dealers are licked anyway and have nowhere else to go; their hopes of a coalition with the Republicans were destroyed at Chicago. We hope the President will not only throw his weight behind the Wallace renomination but do what he can to see that the Democratic Party matches the Republican Party's stand on the Negro. That much is due in all justice to the black man. Politically, the South must vote for Roosevelt in any case, but a strong and honest position on the FEPC, poll taxes, and lynching would be of crucial importance in several key Northern states.

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GOVERNOR DEWEY'S FIRST PLEDGE TO THE nation, in his acceptance speech at Chicago, was "that on January 20 next year our government will again have a Cabinet of the ablest men and women to be found in America." The emphasis he gave to this promise and the manner in which it was hailed in the Republican press both suggest that it is to be featured in his campaign. However, a pledge of this sort remains unimpressive until it descends from the general to the particular. Voters are likely to ask just what men and women Mr. Dewey has in mind: they will want to see whether his definition of ability coincides with their own. It is doubtful whether this legitimate curiosity will be satisfied, since Mr. Dewey told reporters at Chicago that he was not picking his Cabinet at this time. Yet it would be unfair to make the broad accusation that the G. O. P.'s candidate is selling pigs in pokes, for the platform on which he stands gives us a strong hint about the identity of one future Cabinet officer if there is a change of Administration next year. The Department of Labor, it declares, should embrace all agencies dealing with labor and should be headed by a real labor representative. We assume this is a pledge that the post will be given to a union leader if Mr. Dewey wins the right of appointment. But what leader, and from which of the four major labor groups in the country? There are circumstantial rumors around that the answer may be "Big Bill" Hutcheson, septuagenarian boss of the A. F. of L. Carpenters' Union. Hutcheson, long the G. O. P.'s tame labor leader, is not only prominent in A. F. of L. councils but close to John L. Lewis. True, nobody would pick Big Bill as among the "ablest" men in the country, and he is neither young nor vigorous. But the Republican range of choice is so limited that Mr. Dewey may have to overlook these defects.

ALTHOUGH THE ARMS PROGRAM IS LAGGING in some sectors, cutbacks have resulted in idle men and machines elsewhere. This has increased the pressure for immediate reconversions of unemployed facilities to the production of much-needed civilian goods. It has also led to a tense situation in Washington, where Chairman Nelson of the War Production Board is at loggerheads with most of the vice-chairmen, with the army and navy, and with the War Manpower Commission. On June 19 Nelson signed orders making available materials for the construction of working models for post-war production, canceling limitation orders on the use of aluminum and magnesium—now plentiful—and permitting manufacturers to purchase machinery, tools, and dies wherever possible without interference with war production. Shortly afterward the WPB chairman became ill, and in his absence these orders have not been put through. According to Senator Truman, who is strongly supporting Nelson's proposals, the opposition from within the board is inspired by the large corporations which are still fully engaged on armament work and fear small competitors may be allowed to get ahead of them. The army, navy, and War Manpower Commission are concerned with the severe labor shortages in certain vital production fields, including foundries, coal mines, tank arsenals, tire plants, and shipyards. They believe that unemployment elsewhere might be a helpful factor in steering labor to the shortage areas. It is not clear, however, that aircraft workers who lose their jobs on Long Island can be persuaded to migrate to Akron to make tires. And it is certain that the problems of reconversion will be multiplied if we wait to start until all war contracts are completed and everyone can turn to civilian production simultaneously.

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SO THEY SPRAYED PARAFFIN ON THE BIG TOP after they had dissolved the paraffin in gasoline. It was fine for waterproofing canvas, they said. And it was the biggest big top in the world. But it didn't rain that afternoon in Hartford. It was hot with midsummer heat. Circuses are for summer time and all the kids were there. The fire, they say, took about three seconds to climb from near one entrance right up to the top of the center pole, and in ten minutes it was all over and a hundred and forty-odd people had been burned to death —most of them children. We thought we had grown used to death and disaster; they are part of our tragic era. But this was close. These were not statistics transmuted into the costs or rewards of victory; they were burned bodies in a gray armory in a New England town. Perhaps our grief and horror relate us more closely to the suffering of our devastated world. That is not enough. For these deaths in Hartford were needless. Let us say it. Whatever the court may decide, we say these deaths were due to criminal negligence. If the law was

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violated in a failure to provide a fireproof tent, then those responsible should be punished with severity. If the law permits an unfireproof tent, saturated with paraffin, to house six thousand people at a circus, then we all share in the criminal negligence that holds human life so cheap. It is poor atonement for this crime to insist now that by law, and by the enforcement of law, we make impossible a repetition of the tragedy.

# *The Monetary Conference*

BRETTON WOODS," says I. F. Stone in an article on another page, "is a historic battle." So it is, but it is only one engagement in a war of political and economic ideas which is being fought on many fronts. The prolonged struggle between internationalists and isolationists, the bitter conflict between the advocates of a planned economy and the champions of laissez faire, the renewed fight between free-traders and tariffists, all these campaigns are part of the same war. If international political relations remain in a state of anarchy after the war, what hope is there of economic cooperation? Or if commercial relations between nations are allowed once again to degenerate into a game of beggar-my-neighbor, how secure will be any organization to maintain peace? Finally, if the great industrial nations permit their domestic economies to collapse, what is there to prevent another and worse world depression breeding dictatorships and wars?

"Peace is indivisible," Maxim Litvinov once said at Geneva, and Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau, in his opening address to the United Nations Monetary Conference, echoed: "Prosperity is indivisible." The truth is that peace and prosperity are indivisible and to secure either we must concentrate on establishing both. That, in itself, is not a hard idea to establish in the minds of the citizens whose votes are the decisive weapons in this battle for the future. But many of its implications are, admittedly, difficult to grasp. We are grateful, therefore, that the Bretton Woods conference has been flung open to the press and that the American delegation is making conscientious efforts to assist reporters in making the issues clear.

The basis of the conference discussions is a draft proposal for an international stabilization fund drawn up by the technical experts of some thirty of the participating nations. It is not necessary, as Mr. Harry White, the American delegate who is acting as spokesman for the conference, has pointed out, for all the forty-four countries represented to ratify any agreement reached before the fund can be set up. It may begin operations when approved by governments contributing 65 per cent of the aggregate quotas. However, agreement between Britain and the United States, the two greatest trading nations, is absolutely essential. And these two countries, the one representing international debtors, the other international creditors, tend to suspect each other's motives.

We have for so long been accustomed to think of Britain as the international money-lender par excellence, that it is perhaps hard to realize how fundamentally its position has changed during the course of this war. From one point of view, it is today a bankrupt nation. Not only has it spent a large part of its international resources—gold and foreign investments—in prosecuting the war, but it has had to give I. O. U.'s to countries supplying it with goods for which it could not pay by means of exports. By the end of this year blocked sterling credits belonging to other nations will amount to $12 billion—not far short of Britain's total foreign investments before the war. These credits will eventually have to be paid off in the form of British services and goods. But that is not the only reason why Britain will have to expand exports far above their pre-war level. Before the war it consistently bought from other countries far more than it sold and settled the balance by means of shipping and other services and the proceeds of its foreign investments. As we have already noted, these investments have been largely liquidated; hence, in order to maintain its international balance of payments, Britain will either have to sell still more goods abroad or curb imports drastically. The second alternative would mean a terrific cut in the British standard of living and would have catastrophic effects on the economies of the many countries that have relied on the British market to absorb their surpluses. Consequently, if ways cannot be found to develop an expanding economy for the world, thus enabling it to enlarge its exports sufficiently, Britain is likely to be forced to adopt an elaborate barter system and organize its chief suppliers and customers as a closed sterling bloc. It is hardly necessary to point out how adversely such a development would affect American interests or how little conducive it would be to world peace.

A post-war expansion of exports is not such a critical necessity for the United States, but it may have an important bearing on our prosperity. The heavy industries, whose capacity has grown so much under the pressure of war, will not be able to find an outlet for all their production at home. And there will be eager buyers in the war-devastated countries for our capital goods. But if we want to expand exports we must also increase our imports to an even greater extent or, as Britain did throughout a large part of the nineteenth century, add constantly to our foreign investments. In any case the provision of credit to foreign customers will be necessary in the immediate post-war period, for until their economies have recovered they will not be able to sell us their goods. Therefore, unless we want to isolate our economy, we shall have to provide loans in one

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form or another. Is this job to be left to the haphazard operations of private bankers, as it was in the twenties, or are we to cooperate in constructing new channels of international credit less liable to choke just when they are most needed? The proposed International Stabilization Fund—really a device for providing short-term credit—and the International Bank of Reconstruction and Development—a plan for making available long-term loans—offer a means of putting surplus American capital to work both for our own good and that of the world. But before this hope can be achieved the *Panzers* of Wall Street must be overcome. Bretton Woods is the first skirmish; the final battle will be at the polling booths.

# *Inside Red China*

FOR the first time since the establishment of the Chinese Nationalist government a party of regularly accredited representatives of the foreign press has been permitted to visit the areas controlled by the Chinese Communists and to cable dispatches abroad. The report of this group is especially significant since it is the first occasion on which neutral observers have been able to check on the favorable picture presented earlier by several travelers who, whatever their competence, could be said to be predisposed to see the best in "Red China." It is important also in view of the negotiations said to be under way at Chungking looking to a war-time settlement of the long dispute betwen the Kuomintang government and the Communist regime in the northwest.

So far most of the dispatches from the correspondents visiting in Yenan, capital of Red China, have been necessarily brief. Having passed through Chungking's rigid censorship, they may be somewhat incomplete. Yet enough has already come out to dispose rather effectively of the persistent Chungking reports that the Communist areas were an "economic vacuum," that the Communists had taken advantage of the united front to undermine Chiang Kai-shek, and that the Red Army had refused to fight the Japanese.

The report on the economic achievements of the Communist regime is particularly striking in view of the conditions of acute poverty described by all the earlier observers. It has been generally assumed that conditions had further deteriorated under the impact of the war and Chungking's economic blockade. Yet the New York *Times* correspondent reports that "the formerly barren north Shensi country, which previously had not recovered from the devastation and depopulation of the great Mohammedan revolt of the eighteen sixties . . . has been transformed into an area of intensive cultivation, stock breeding, and handicraft industry." He adds that "the area has created sufficient food and clothing for the Eighth Route Army units . . . who are among the best-clothed and best-fed the writer has seen anywhere in China." Harrison Forman, writing for the New York *Herald Tribune,* describes in some detail how the soldiers of the Chinese Red Army have reclaimed tens of thousands of acres of mountainous, wild wasteland and transformed it into a "patchwork quilt of fields of wheat, millet, cotton, and corn."

Despite the blockade, the effect of which has been felt primarily in the shortage of medicines and heavy munitions, the reports show that the population and troops in the Communist areas are enthusiastically loyal to the Chinese government and the United Nations. The *Times* correspondent speaks of "a realization of the nearness of the counter-offensive against Japan, in which the Communist armies and guerrillas want to participate to the fullest," and adds that "there is no doubt that the Communist armies . . . are valuable allies in the anti-Japanese war." Mr. Forman quotes Mao Tse-tung, chairman of the Communist Party of China, as stating that it was the purpose of his party "to support Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, to persist in Kuomintang cooperation as well as cooperation with the whole people of China, to struggle for the overthrow of Japanese imperialism, and to build an independent and democratic China." The charge that the Eighth Route Army has refused to fight is refuted by the fact that nearly all its weapons have been captured from the Japanese.

It seems hardly likely that the Chungking government would have permitted these reports to be cabled to America unless there was definite prospect of an early reconciliation between the Kuomintang and the Communists. But as yet there have been no reports from Chungking to indicate that progress is being made in the protracted negotiations. On the contrary, little more than a week ago the Chinese Minister of Information repeated the charge that the Eighth Route Army had refused to attack the Japanese when ordered to do so. This charge may be technically true, for it is obvious that relations between the Kuomintang and the Communists have disintegrated to a point where little active military cooperation is possible. As Americans we are not concerned with the charges and counter-charges made against each other by these two powerful Chinese factions. What does concern us is an ending of the internal struggle so that all the resources of China can be turned against our common foe.

*Freda Kirchwey will be the guest of honor at a Bastille Day celebration next Friday evening, July 14, at Hunter College, in New York. France Forever, under whose auspices the meeting is being held, has announced that Henri Etienne Hoppenot, minister plenipotentiary and delegate of the French Provisional Government, will be present.*

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# *The War Fronts*

BY CHARLES G. BOLTE

## Break-through and Break-out

BREAK-THROUGH on the east, break-out on the west: those were Germany's two bad breaks last week. Earlier, Adolf Hitler had said at General Dietl's funeral: "How could a struggle which has behind it all the fanaticism of a nation end otherwise than in victory, quite irrespective of what the situation may be at the moment?" Fanaticism was not enough between Polotsk and Kovel, or between Caen and La Haye du Puits. Mountains and lengthening Allied supply lines might aid the defense in Italy, but in the east and west overpowering strength, superior generalship, and command of the air answered Hitler's desperate question.

By last Sunday the break-through on the east extended some 375 miles, from Polotsk southwest to Kovel and beyond it to the line of the Polish Bug. Sixteen days of whirlwind fighting on the White Russian front saw the Red Army advance as much as 225 miles—14 miles a day, which means a broken and disorderly German retreat: five major fortresses, from Vitebsk 160 miles south to Zhlobin, were taken in six days from the opening of the offensive. Not only were these fortresses reduced on four successive days, but the defenders were largely killed or captured where they fought, so that there was no chance for effective rearguard action covering the retreat to previously prepared positions in the rear.

One result of this was that the Russian rate of advance hit thirty or thirty-five miles a day in some cases, as good as anything the Germans did in Poland or France. Another result was that the two Russian armies on the flanks of the break-through, Cherniakovsky's Third White Russian Army in the north and Rokossovsky's First White Russian Army in the south, were able to execute a classic pincers against Minsk. Last winter one would have expected Minsk to hold out for weeks or months; instead, it was a matter of hours. And the slower advance of Zakharov's Second White Russian Army from Mogilev directly toward Minsk paid a good dividend in the form of a considerable encirclement *east* of Minsk, which cost the enemy several thousand more troops.

This is the true aim of Allied strategy—to destroy the enemy where he stands, rather than to drive him back to a new line where he can fight another day. In this, of course, the Germans have aided by their policy of holding ground instead of attempting to cut their losses. From June 23 through July 8 the Germans lost 275,000 men on the White Russian Front, according to Soviet communiqués; and even after adding a pinch of salt and subtracting *x* thousand, this is a tremendous loss.

Nor is that all. As fresh news of German disasters came in day after day, I moved my little red pins across the map and guessed at probable new lines on which the enemy might hold for a while. Bagramian's drive in the north from Polotsk toward Dvinsk threatened to cut off all the Germans in Latvia and Estonia; obviously Dvinsk would be defended strongly, and the line would run southwest through Vilna and Grodno to Bialystok, thence south through Brest-Litovsk to Lvov and the Carpathians. A good holding line in front of this strong position would have been Vilna-Lida-Baranovichi; but Baranovichi fell Saturday, Vilna was entered the same day, and Lida fell Sunday.

The military experts of the German High Command, luckily, are having a worse time than the military experts of the American press, because a wrong guess for them means another five divisions lost. In the case of Vilna, it may mean twenty-five or more divisions. Strategically, the denial of rail transit through Vilna is almost as serious as the loss of Dvinsk: the German troops in the north can now get home only via the secondary line west from Dvinsk through Lithuania to Tilsit, or via the coastal line through Riga.

Faced with the terrible pressure of three fronts, the Germans have begun showing a tendency to cut their losses, as witness the evacuation of Kovel and the reported withdrawal to the Bug—the line from which the great Russian misadventure started three years ago last month. Perhaps a similar decision is already being taken in the north, and the enemy's army group will be pulled back before Bagramian reaches Dvinsk.

Russian strength, speed, skill, and strategy make one hesitate to predict a stopping-point for this rapidly developing German disaster. Behind Vilna lies Kaunas, from which the Niemen runs south to Grodno; but the Red Army crosses big rivers without drawing breath. Brest-Litovsk is an exceptionally strong fortress; but so was Minsk. Granted that the Germans get fresh troops into position and that the Red Army outpaces its reinforcements and supplies temporarily, we may see a halt on the general line Riga-Brest-Litovsk-Lvov, with the Germans withdrawing from the north and from the Pripet salient thrust between Baranovichi and Kovel. Then there is Zhukov's massive First Ukrainian Army waiting south of Rokossovsky; and westward for the Germans, a much shorter line from Königsberg through Warsaw to Krakow. Behind lies Berlin.

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The break-out in the west, presaged by the week-end fall of Caen and La Haye du Puits, is on a smaller scale but will prove as decisive. The Allied story has been one of hard fighting and sound preparations; the German, one of missed opportunity. The British and Canadians on the left flank defeated superior German armor piecemeal, which means that the strategic counter-attack to drive the Allies into the sea will never come. American troops showed their flexibility by turning amphibian on the right flank, and wading across flooded ground to seize important communications centers.

The beachhead battle is over; the man who failed to prevent the establishment of the beachhead is unemployed, his place taken by a good defensive general apparently more acceptable to the Nazi Party and to the "suggestions" of his underling, Rommel; war of movement in the west is about to begin. The rumor that Hitler has taken personal command in the west is a source of modest gratification to the Allies, who have four-to-one superiority in fire power and overmastering strength in the air, while the Luftwaffe and the German ground forces fight over gas and oil already cut 70 per cent by Allied air attack. Berlin is not much farther from Caen than it is from Kovel.

# *The Cross of Gold*

BY I. F. STONE

*Washington, July 6*

MAY I offer a few tentative observations toward an understanding of what is happening at the United Nations Financial and Monetary Conference at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire?

1. The United States, with most of the world's gold, must find some way to revive the gold standard, or see this metal lose much of its value.

2. Its only major ally in this is the Soviet Union, a large gold-producing country.

3. But the Soviet Union, as a Socialist country, is interested in gold only as an export commodity, whose value it wishes to maintain. As a Socialist country, it is largely insulated from the difficulties created by an international gold standard and the necessities imposed by such a standard on domestic policy.

4. That these difficulties are enormous is shown by American experience under the New Deal. Though the world's richest country, we were forced to suspend the gold standard in order to be able to embark on a program of deficit financing, credit expansion, unemployment relief, and public works for economic revival.

5. Had Mr. Roosevelt not suspended gold payment, these measures would have brought about a flight from the dollar that would have further depressed prices and intensified the economic crisis.

6. The crisis itself was largely due to the fact that poorer countries had to dump their products on the world market at any price they would bring in order to obtain gold to pay their debts.

7. Revival of the conventional gold standard would again subject other nations, and our own, to these cyclical disturbances in all their intensity, and make it impossible for them to use monetary management and spending to cushion the effect on the domestic economy.

8. Just what this means may become clearer if we look at the case of Britain. Britain, with little gold left, is no longer the traditional citadel of the gold standard. The extent of the revolution which has occurred in British financial thinking may be seen from the fact that J. M. Keynes, once a heretic for his opposition to the gold standard, was forced to defend himself in the House of Lords last May from a charge that he was trying—by his negotiations with the United States Treasury—once more to link Britain with gold. "I confess," said Lord Addison in that debate, "I have never been convinced that to dig gold out of the ground in South Africa and to bury it refined in a cellar in the United States is, in fact, adding to the wealth of the world."

9. Closely linked with this new British attitude toward the gold standard is the new and equally revolutionary British attitude toward the problem of post-war employment. The official Report on Employment Policy presented by Lord Woolton as Minister of Reconstruction states: "The Government are prepared to accept in the future the responsibility for taking action at the earliest possible stage to arrest a threatened slump. This involves a new approach and a new responsibility for the state. It was at one time believed that every trade depression would automatically bring its own corrective, since prices and wages would fall, the fall in prices would bring about an increase in demand, and employment would thus be restored. Experience has shown, however, that under modern conditions this process of self-recovery, if effective at all, is likely to be extremely prolonged and to be accompanied by widespread distress, particularly in a complex society like our own." That is the end of classical economics in Britain.

10. To carry out the purposes indicated, the British intend to keep the rate of interest low and prevent the flight of capital abroad. "We abjure," Lord Keynes said, in terms that must sound downright blasphemous in

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Wall Street, "the instruments of bank rate and credit contraction operating through the increase of unemployment as a means of forcing our domestic economy into line with external factors."

11. This trend toward positive governmental interference to combat the trade cycle is world wide.

12. Only in the United States is there strong opposition to this trend. This comes from banking circles and their academic satellites. There is agreement (1) on the need to take some steps to revive international lending and (2) to help stabilize world currencies. But the American banker's approach is indicated in the hearings held here by the House Foreign Affairs Committee on the resolution by Representative Charles S. Dewey, Republican, of Illinois, for a central reconstruction fund.

13. What sticks especially in the banker craw is that the international stabilization fund and world bank proposed at Bretton Woods would considerably reduce the power of the private international banker. The present American government and any British government will be committed to a cheap-money policy, and the bank would give lenders a bargaining weapon with which to hold down interest rates. The proposal for the world bank says it "shall make no loans or investments that can be placed through the usual private investment channels at reasonable rates." The last three words are the key to that.

14. The Dewey hearings indicate that what the bankers want is a small central reconstruction fund, run entirely by Americans, without international interference, and able to dictate "sound financial policies"—that is, a balanced budget and no social experiments—to countries which want to borrow. The kind of program envisaged by the British is exactly the kind of "unsound financing" American bankers wish to prevent. Representative Dewey, an assistant secretary of the Treasury in the '20's and once financial adviser to Poland, reflects the conventional banking point of view. "If a country proceeds on an inflationary spending policy," he told the committee, "it results in injuring its foreign credit. When a country tries to live within its means, it will be able at all times to get credit throughout the world to assist in its normal development; but if it tries to lift itself by its bootstraps and tries to do everything that it would like to do before the economy of the country is sufficiently strong to support it, why it is going to collapse." Dewey's favorite anecdote in illustration of sound financial practice is the story he tells of how he prevented the city of Warsaw from borrowing $20,000,000 for slum clearance and housing. That, from a banking point of view, was an unproductive loan—though many of Dewey's banker friends were quite willing to lend huge sums at 8 per cent to Latin American dictators to build marble outhouses.

15. The main job of foreign lending, in Representative Dewey's view, which is the Wall Street view, must be done by the private bankers, though "they may have to come to some department of the government, such as the Reconstruction Finance Corporation . . . to get assistance when the period is a little too long or when . . . they themselves might be in straitened circumstances for working capital." In other words, they are quite willing to let the government share the risk, provided they have the power.

16. The United States Treasury is trying to work out a way to give our gold some value as a standard without crippling other nations economically. Wall Street, with the world's greatest aggregation of capital, is fighting to maintain its power after the war. The technicalities may be dull, but Bretton Woods is a historic battle.

## *50 Years Ago in "The Nation"*

WHETHER WE LIKE IT OR NOT, we must admit the cold fact that the income tax has come, and probably has come to stay. Recognized by economists as, theoretically, a just and even an ideal tax, it has cunningly been put into a form to give it the greatest possible strength with the masses of a democratic country.—*July 5, 1894.*

THERE IS NO QUESTION that these men (Gilbert and Sullivan) have created a new school of English opera, the first since Purcell, which did not live long. Probably the new school will not live far into the next century, but even if it dies, it will have supplied an enormous amount of harmless entertainment and hilarity to hundreds of thousands of theatergoers, hilarity never aroused at the expense of propriety.—*July 12, 1894.*

THE COLLAPSE OF THE PULLMAN STRIKE is not the most important development of the week. Transcending this in significance is the demonstration that such a strike can never again be so formidable in this country. . . . It is now universally recognized that such a strike as Debs ordered is a rebellion, and that the people of the United States will promptly suppress rebellion. . . . The next upstart who orders the laboring men of the land to make a national boycott will fare about the same way as a man down South who should propose that his section secede from the Union.—*July 19, 1894.*

THERE ARE FEW NAMES in current French literature more popular than that of Guy de Maupassant. He belongs to that realistic school of novelists which had for its first leaders Flaubert and the Goncourt brothers. . . . On the whole, Maupassant's books will remain for a while as a curious document on the manners and thoughts of the end of the nineteenth century in France. Such men as "Max Nordau" will cite them as proof of the decadence and degeneracy of the Latin race. Though their form is sometimes very perfect, it is doubtful if they will take a permanent place in French literature.—*July 19, 1894.*

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# *Goodby to the Revolution!*

BY J. ALVAREZ DEL VAYO

SINCE the dawn of June 6, when British and American soldiers stepped on the soil of France, victory has been the faithful companion of the Allies. On all fronts, with the single exception of China, the enemy is being beaten day and night, on land, on the sea, in the air. Even those who have been most cautious in their predictions have been impressed by the excellence of the preparations and the perfection in the execution of the plans. Military events could not move faster or better. The United Nations have enjoyed first-class leadership in the military field.

It was to be expected that with the approach of victory the disparity between the way the war has been conducted in the field and the way it has been conducted politically should become more striking. This disparity can best be visualized if we imagine two commentators, one military and one political, both writing on the outlook for the war. The military critic need not restrain his optimism, but even the most cautious writer runs the risk of sounding too confident when he discusses the political prospects. The capture of Minsk took only forty-eight hours. The recognition of De Gaulle has already been delayed for ten months, and though his visit to Washington may have proved useful in many respects, it did not produce recognition. The war is already five years old, and the true climate of Europe has not yet been grasped.

Militarily, the most daring expectations have been fulfilled. Politically, the most modest hopes have been frustrated. If there is a different policy for Europe from the one we have known until now, it is the best-kept secret of the war.

With regard to the enemy countries no plan has been announced beyond unconditional surrender. But already in Italy we have seen how inadequate this formula proved. It may be that there the Allies expected they would advance by taking town after town. Based upon that assumption, their program was very simple. In each town the Allies occupied, they would put AMG authorities to work and relegate broad political problems to the indefinite future. But when the whole fascist structure suddenly crumbled with the overthrow of Mussolini, a political vacuum was produced for which the Allies were entirely unprepared.

The same thing may happen with Germany. It is possible that the Germans will be finally knocked out on their own soil. But it is also possible that the collapse will take place outside the frontiers, through the defeat of the German forces in the east and in the west. Many situations could then arise. Suppose, for instance, that inside Germany *Arbeiterräte* (workers' councils) like those created in 1918 should spring into existence. In such a case, military occupation might prove a nebulous policy, incapable by itself of meeting the complex problems of German political and social revolution. Have the Allied strategists devised a policy to meet such contingencies?

### FAILURE AFTER FAILURE

But if the need for caution in dealing with enemy countries sufficiently explains the tendency of the Allied governments to leave the entire political problem to military leaders, such an attitude is without justification for the rest of Europe, which is ready for democracy and which is dying for democracy, just as the Allied troops are doing. Wherever the anti-fascist forces in the occupied countries have scored a success, it has not been with the support of Washington and London, but against their will. In not one case has the official policy of the Allies led the process of democratic restoration. To what has this failure been due? Partly, of course, to the fact that what the tories of both capitals have in their hearts is the survival of the social regime of the pre-war era rather than a victory of the peoples. But it is partly due, also, to their inability to understand the political climate of the new Europe. To imagine, for instance, that the *maquis* forces were going to allow their conduct to be affected by the fact that certain outspoken opponents of De Gaulle had achieved social position and influence in Washington was to ignore what has been happening in France since 1940—indeed, since 1934. And to think that after three years of open war in Spain and five years of secret war against Franco, the Spanish people, in order to cater to the British love of kings, were likely to accept the elevation of Don Juan betrayed not only a diehard attitude but a stupid one as well.

Thus the reactionary spirit coupled with political misunderstanding has led the Allies from failure to failure. This long chain of political defeats has a common characteristic. In each case the Allied rulers have tried to support the right and have ended by being obliged to accept the left. It has happened again and again, from the attempts to create an atmosphere favorable to the restoration of the old monarchies, as in the famous episode of Otto of Hapsburg's Austrian battalion, through the support given to the King of Greece and Mihailovich, down to the attempts to build Allied policy in the "liberated" areas around Giraud and Badoglio.

In no case has the policy proved ultimately successful. The Hapsburg adventure fizzled out amid general laugh-

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ter; Mihailovich had to give way to Tito; Giraud disappeared from the political scene; while Badoglio could not spend one night in Rome as Prime Minister. Not even at the zenith of Allied military power have the peoples of Europe showed the least disposition to permit the policy of appeasement and compromise to decide their destinies. Even as a "hard-boiled," "realistic" policy—and to hell with the Four Freedoms!—it has been a failure, leading to nothing except the discredit of its promoters. If this has happened during a period of military triumph, one can easily imagine what will remain of the political authority of the Allies if they insist on the same course when the glamour of battle has faded and all kinds of annoying and thorny problems have replaced the excitement of the fight. It is therefore high time that the reactionary plans of the leaders be thrown aside as mischievous and unrealizable and that a policy based upon European facts emerge to fill the political vacuum which the lack of a responsible, democratic conduct of the war has created.

### FIRST TASK: END FASCISTS

The policy of favoring the most reactionary elements has had as its basis two factors, one of them difficult to change, the other easier to overcome. The first is monopoly capitalism, whose power and future hopes are directly menaced by every swing to the left in Europe. It is difficult to come to an agreement with the representatives of those financial interests which plan to draw Europe into their cartels as a deaf and dumb associate. They know with which groups they can deal, and they will support every effort to keep, or put, those groups in power. But there is a second element that can be won and made helpful to the democratic cause: namely, that large section of Allied opinion, particularly American opinion, which has accepted the official policy of the Allies not because it wants to see monopolistic capital the victor but simply because it has not understood what has been going on in Europe during the last fifteen years and therefore cannot understand what is going on now.

These people do not realize that fascism has divided Europe into two irreconcilable camps, that long before hostilities with the Axis coalition had begun, the fight against fascism had assumed the character of a war. It was a fight to the death in which people killed and were killed. It was more embittered and more violent than many civil wars. It *was* civil war, and a war without truce, without any prospect of conciliation. To destroy or to be destroyed: no space for a negotiated peace. For an American liberal, even for an American labor leader, indeed for anyone who has lived in the free atmosphere of America, the intensity of that fight is difficult to grasp. Americans have not lived under terror, perceived the meaning of police rule, endured the torture and death of their closest associates, experienced the vulgar brutality of fascist agitation smearing everything noble in man. They could sympathize with us European democrats but could not share entirely our hate.

In Europe the anti-fascist masses had decided to put an end to fascism forever when the war broke out. The war concentrated the struggle on the defeat of Hitler and the Axis coalition, but the underlying nature of the fight did not change. The bitter political conflict which had divided Europe was incorporated into the war of armies and machines. Everywhere the fascists and appeasers of 1938 and 1939 became the collaborationists of 1940. A repulsive M. de Brinon who before the war was hated as fascist was now doubly hated as fascist and as Quisling. Europe has had thousands and thousands of De Brinons. But it is not the individual but the regime, the movement—fascism itself—that must be destroyed. The end of the armed power of Hitler and Mussolini is a prerequisite to all else, but it will not mean the end of fascism, not after the policy of temporizing with fascism that has been practiced in these last four years. For the peoples of Europe the fight against fascism will still be an unfinished job. In North Africa, in Italy, in France, in every land that has so far been liberated, the people have shown their determination to get that job done. The first principle of a new, genuinely democratic policy on the part of the Allies must be to permit the people to do it. This will not be easy. American authorities have a strong predilection for "order"—even at the expense of freedom. And without a clear understanding of the irreconcilable nature of the political conflict in Europe, the natural tendency of American administrators will be to put obstacles in the way of the democratic forces. This tendency must be restrained if the war against fascism is to be conclusively won.

### FULL POWER TO ANTI-FASCISTS

In America democracy exists, at least it has until today. In Europe it must be re-created. The first thing, therefore, that Americans must understand is that in the Europe of today and in the Europe of after the war, the democratic process will be quite different from what it is in the United States. That is why the AMG cannot fill the vacuum produced through the destruction of normal and free political life. The people themselves, through their own authorities, must take charge of the situation. More concretely, each national government, provisional or not, in so far as it actually represents the elements of resistance, must direct the arduous process of reestablishing democracy.

It will be a hard task and not a very pleasant one, but it must be undertaken and carried through to the last consequence. It is very well for the honorable Signor Orlando, with his eighty-five years and his liberal ideas dating from the pre-Mussolini era, to oppose the eradication of fascism on the ground that "fascism was never strong in Italy and that there is nothing to eradicate"—as he told Herbert L. Matthews in an interview published

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in the New York *Times* on June 30. But the workers of Milan and Turin who, only twenty-four hours after the downfall of Mussolini, went into the streets to fight both German and Fascists, knew better. And the French anti-fascists who two weeks ago killed Philippe Henriot, the Goebbels of Vichy, also knew better. And they know too that even the elimination of all the Philippe Henriots that infest Europe will not settle the question. To destroy fascism is something more complex than a problem of justice or revenge. Even in defeat fascism will try to raise its head. The restoration of democracy in Europe requires more than pious words and noble wishes.

It requires political experience, moral authority, knowledge of the people, of the masses, of the corrupt machinery of the past that must be destroyed. It requires understanding of the organizations, the union leaders, the men in the village, in the town, in the nation, who can be trusted with the process of democratic restoration. The fight will not cease with the firing of the last bullet, with the expulsion of fascists and collaborationists from power, with the liberation of the entire country, not even with the proclamation of formal peace in Europe. A period will follow in which the forces of fascism under every disguise, even the democratic disguise, will try to survive and to prepare for the next coup. To face that danger we must have at the head of every European government, provisional or permanent, people hardened in the fight against fascism, alert to the desires of the nation but at the same time ready to resist the demands of irresponsible groups inside the country, conciliatory and responsive in their relations with the Allied powers but ready also to resist any pressure from outside which would substitute favored reactionary elements for representatives of the popular will. The creation and protection of democracy in Europe requires strong governments in the period of transition.

In the economic field the problems that every state will have to settle call for a great deal of imagination, of audacity, of readiness to break with the social conceptions and the social privileges of the past. All persons acquainted with the present European situation agree that the reorganization of Europe will demand many socialistic measures. The liberation forces in every country have come out strongly in favor of increased public control over major industries and the national resources. For that, too, a strong government is necessary. Both political and economic conditions point in the direction of increased executive power. How this power can be controlled by the popular will, how to combine collectivism and freedom—these are the great questions that will confront post-war Europe. They can only be answered by the people themselves. Interference from outside, however well meant, can only produce, in magnified degree, the "chaos" which the AMG was created to avoid.

### WHY EUROPE MUST GO LEFT

Europe must go to the left for many reasons. The first is the treason of the right. Everywhere the right as a whole, out of hostility to any form of European New Deal and out of fear of Russia, sympathized with fascism, forced the Munich capitulation, and advocated an understanding with the Axis powers. It was the "two hundred families" who wanted fascism in France before 1939. It was again the "two hundred families" from whom the greatest number of Vichy collaborationists derived. This alone would have been enough to push the peoples of Europe to the left.

Then there is the immense appeal of the Russian victories. It may be easy for capitalists and politicians to draw a distinction, when it suits them, between Russia and the Russian regime; to acclaim the heroism of the Russian armies and the ability of the Russian generals as qualities inherent in a great nation which has always been known for its pride and its courage. But to the common man, whose century Henry Wallace has announced, the Russian victories are more than that: they are victories of the only proletarian state in the world. Neither the Bolshevik purges, nor Russia's pact with Germany at the beginning of the war against Hitler, nor the Soviet recognition of Badoglio, whether or not they momentarily dampened enthusiasm for Russia, have altered the fact that the present Russian state was born of a socialist revolution and that an economic system prevails in Russia today quite different from the capitalistic system. To the peoples of Europe, that Socialist Russia which has so ably organized production, which has created the best army in the world, which has drawn its factory foremen, its engineers, its generals from the working class, remains an inspiration. This does not mean that the peoples of Europe would welcome in their respective countries the introduction of a system exactly like the Russian. We have already the report from Oscar Lange that the officers and soldiers of the Polish army organized in Russia expressed their preference for a non-Communist Poland. But the example of Russia greatly encourages Europe to move in the direction of socialism, if not toward a proletarian dictatorship.

Thirdly, British-American policy in itself, by supporting the most reactionary elements everywhere, has produced a defensive move which, in practice, has become a further move toward the left. In 1941 De Gaulle, who never expected to be rewarded for his fight against Hitler with the hostility of Washington, surrounded himself with representatives of the French bourgeoisie. These were the men most easily available—young diplomats stranded in London by the collapse of France, refugees who had had sufficient means or power to escape in the desperate days after the surrender—and they represented the element from which De Gaulle himself emerged. Darlanist expediency led De Gaulle to seek

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support among the forces of resistance in France and encouraged their sympathizers in North Africa to resist the maneuvers of Washington. He found this support mainly among Socialists and Communists, who comprised the bulk of the resistance movement. By taking a position against him, Washington pushed De Gaulle toward the left and at the same time reconciled the left to him.

Nor did the warm-hearted words about Franco spoken by Mr. Churchill in the House of Commons have a different effect. The answer to that ill-inspired tribute was a stiffening of guerrilla activities and a call from the leaders of the underground to the Spanish people to "prepare for the coming rebellion." This was the first time since the end of the Spanish war that such an expression had been used in an illegal manifesto. That, inside Spain itself. Among the political exiles Mr. Churchill's speech resulted in a series of statements by the most temperate leaders of the Republican parties which even the left Socialists could not have strengthened. Thus in Spain as in France Anglo-American policy has succeeded in making the trend more radical.

For two years reports have come out of the occupied countries which have reflected very well the state of mind there. As early as 1942 André Philip, a moderate Socialist just escaped from France, a member of De Gaulle's committee, gave an impressive picture of the discussions that were going on in the French underground about the post-war world. He described a new Europe in the making. But to the State Department and the Foreign Office the view of diplomatic experts of the old regime like M. Alexis Leger, or of amateur diplomats like Señor de Madariaga, seemed more important than all the news coming from inside Europe. On the other hand, certain distinguished columnists like Anne O'Hare McCormick have interpreted the stories of the hungry and tired populations as proof of an apathetic Europe. We hope that they will pay equal attention, not only to the organized struggle of the people of France, but to the deep significance of the Copenhagen strike—a strike that symbolizes something more than natural patriotic hate of the invader. It clearly reveals how the very peaceable Danish worker has become a revolutionary through the development of the anti-fascist fight.

The mistake of not having seen clearly the dangers inherent in Hitler's rise to power has been paid for by a war. The mistake of not seeing the meaning of the war may be paid for by another war. But before that we may be confronted with a tragic and ironic situation—the liberated countries of Europe struggling to free themselves from their liberators.

# *Have Faith in France*

BY JOSEPH CHAPIRO

IN THIS week of the great French national holiday, Bastille Day, which coincides with the first stage in the liberation of the old Norman soil and with the arrival in the United States of General Charles de Gaulle, it is well to reaffirm one's faith in France: in the France of Joan of Arc which drove out the enemy from abroad; in the France of 1789 which cleansed its soil of the enemy within and proclaimed the immortal principles of liberty, equality, fraternity; in the France which, plunged into the mire by its traitors, is now slowly emerging, purified by the blood of its heroes.

There is a well-known adage that every man has two countries—his own and France. That is why four years ago when France went to pieces militarily and even seemed to deny its moral self, every civilized man felt stricken in his most cherished ideals. This nostalgia, this insatiable idealism which we call the *esprit européen* is conditioned less by geography than by spiritual needs. For one can be a good American or a good Englishman and at the same time a "good European." Did not the insular Winston Churchill, in the course of his last great speech before the House of Commons, claim for himself the title of "good European"? But there can be no Europe without France, which is its essence, as Paris is the essence of France.

It is natural, then, that at many different times Paris has been considered the spiritual capital of the world, the source of its ideas and tastes. Yet Paris, in the course of its history, has often been occupied and sacked by predatory invaders. In the nineteenth century alone and in the space of less than sixty years it was taken three times by enemy armies. In June, 1940, the heart of France, Paris, was again struck a blow so violent that the whole nation was brought to ruin. A hysterical mistrust of France seized the world. "France is finished!" "France is dead!"—these words were on all lips. No one remembered that such charges were as old as France itself. They return to the lips and the pens of witnesses of French history as regularly as the refrain of old French songs. For the thousand-year past of France contains as many disasters as periods of glory.

No other great European nation has been, through the centuries, alternately so despised and so admired, so pitied and so envied; no other has so often been pronounced dead and then extolled for its vitality and overflowing youth. "I have been told that never before was

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there so much baseness in the world, so many crimes, so many sins, so many vices, as today in France," Henry V of England said to Charles d'Orléan, after taking him prisoner at the Battle of Agincourt in 1415. It may be argued that this severe judgment was uttered by an enemy. But it differs no whit from French testimony given in the same century. Indeed, is there any more poignant or more sincerely despairing account of the moral, intellectual, and material disintegration of France than that of the anonymous author of "Le Journal d'un Bourgeois de Paris," covering the period 1405 to 1449?

Yet scarcely had Joan of Arc appeared and her work been completed when the country began to recover with astonishing rapidity. A new age was born—the age of the greatest French poet and the greatest French painter, the age of Villon and Fouquet. Less than a century later the spirit of the age was reflected in a very different book from that of the gloomy Parisian bourgeois. Ronsard's "La Franciade" presented a dazzling image of a happy France, the envy of all Europe, and Rabelais's ribald laughter shook the farthest corners of his country. But even in the sixteenth century this brilliant France was more than once darkened by disaster. Francis I was captured by the Spanish and to obtain his freedom had to sign in 1536 the famous Treaty of Madrid, which despoiled his kingdom of some of its richest provinces. Yet as always France recovered rapidly and again became so powerful that it could force Charles V to renounce the Spanish throne. But no sooner had it gained this victory than it was torn by internal and religious strife. The misery of the people mounted to a climax. Finally, Henry II established order again, to die at the hands of an assassin shortly afterward.

The *grand siècle* of Louis XIV, when France was the richest and most powerful country in Europe, also witnessed disasters rivaling those of preceding centuries. In fact, at the end of the seventeenth century and the beginning of the eighteenth, during the War of the Spanish Succession, France was in such straits that observers spoke of it in the same terms that had been used by the contemporaries of Joan of Arc. Hardly one-tenth of the people had enough to eat. Even the king's ministers, we are told by Fénelon, were reduced to "living a *vie de Bohême* and not at all like men who rule the country." Nevertheless, France recovered, and the eighteenth century became the age of Rousseau, Voltaire, and Diderot, the glorious century of the Encyclopedists.

In 1789 the Revolution began; in 1793 France was invaded from all sides—north, south, east, and west. With magnificent élan the revolutionary armies expelled the enemy. In 1797 came financial bankruptcy. Two years later French currency was the most stable in Europe! Napoleon made the world tremble; then his empire crumbled and France was again invaded. During the nineteenth century collapse and recovery succeeded each other as before, the greatest disaster being the defeat of 1871 and the consequent territorial mutilation and economic ruin. But when the government launched a domestic loan a year later to obtain funds with which to redeem a part of the territory occupied by Prussia, the country was so far restored that within twenty-four hours the loan was oversubscribed fourteen times.

Thus the inexorable rhythm of French history has never varied. The lesson of that history, however, has not been learned. Funeral orations over France have continued to alternate with dithyrambic praises. The contradictory judgments of observers are not to be explained solely by the changing course of events. But the events do much to explain the individual and collective character of the French, which is the source of our faith in France. A contemporary French poet has remarked that his compatriots are the most open and at the same time the most enigmatic people in the world. Their frankness and their lack of hypocrisy make it easy to study them and lead one to believe that one knows them. Then suddenly a storm breaks, the Frenchman reacts in an unexpected manner, and one perceives a side he has not shown before.

This dual nature is the product of his native soil and his history working in opposition to each other but both fashioning him simultaneously and unceasingly. No people are a more faithful image of their country than the French. Observe them closely and you note the same proportion, the same gaiety, the same harmony as in the aspect and products of the land. But in each Frenchman is another man whom history has hammered rudely on its forge, repeatedly dealing him heavier blows than the people of any other great European nation.

The history of the French has developed characteristics which give sharpness to their criticism and gravity to their thoughts. A Frenchman knows how to be serious without appearing to be, often masking his earnestness with a gentle irony that borders on insouciance. In reality he is as thoughtful as he is gay, as profound as he is jolly. In France originated most of the currents of thought that have nourished Europe for the last four centuries. France is the home of fruitful skepticism and creative criticism. It is the home of the democratic revolution and of socialism, too, for socialism was formulated in France long before Karl Marx gave it a scientific base. France is also the country where racial equality was first proclaimed and *realized*. France was the first great power that allowed Negroes to take part in the government; a black deputy from Haiti was even elected vice-president of the Chamber of Deputies. And no one took umbrage when he married a white Frenchwoman.

These extremes in French character can be, one admits, most disconcerting. But if you look closely you will see that instead of being mutually exclusive they

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form a remarkable harmony, a harmony that is manifested in that common sense which, according to Descartes, is the most widely shared thing in France. A violent shock can for a brief period dissociate the elements in this harmony, but they are soon reunited. French stability and balance are shown in the way France remains faithful to tradition while constantly renewing itself either by revolution or by conscious evolution. It may be said that the French are the only people in Europe who without breaking with their past have been able to turn it into a revolutionary factor. I still recall the thunderous voice of Jean Jaurès, the great Socialist tribune, who was so thoroughly imbued with the French tradition. When his reactionary adversaries in the Chamber of Deputies accused him of betraying the French heritage, he turned the charge against them. "It is we who incarnate the true French tradition," he cried, hammering each word home with his fist. "You guard the ashes; we carry the torch."

Logically enough, these traits of character have produced in the French another characteristic of prime importance for their future—a passion for unity. Their regional diversities have made them a savagely individualistic people, while their history has endued them with a spirit of unity which has emerged each time it has been necessary to remake France. However quarrelsome and divided into bitterly antagonistic political parties, this people has always recovered its unity when the enemy dealt it a blow which the world thought mortal.

That is why, apart from the Revolution, the points around which its history has crystallized have not been great events but the names of persons who embodied French unity. Today this unity is forming around the name of Charles de Gaulle. In other times the General might not have been so much to the people's taste. For France has learned to distrust generals in positions of political power. Its experiences with Napoleon, MacMahon, Boulanger, and finally with Pétain were such that it has no wish to repeat them now. What draws the French irresistibly toward De Gaulle, and what France will never forget, is that in the midst of the most appalling confusion and the most formidable treason ever plotted on its soil Charles de Gaulle was the first to rise up and declare that the invasion was only a battle lost, that France was continuing the war at the side of its allies and would continue to fight until its liberation was complete.

Have faith in France! It is no older and no more effete than it was at the time of Joan of Arc. Let us recall how often France has aroused the admiration of the world after a collapse that seemed fatal, and how each time all humanity felt rejuvenated. It will be the same now. It is the rule with France, the rhythm of its history, the cadence of its national life.

# *Willkie's Choice*

BY ARNOLD BEICHMAN

IN 1940 Wendell L. Willkie received 22,304,755 votes, an all-time record for a Republican Presidential nominee. Normally, an unsuccessful candidate remains titular head of his party, is its spokesman on major issues until the next convention. In Willkie's case his defeat ended his importance among the Republican Party political mechanics. Despite his personal popularity with Republican voters the G. O. P. bosses regard him as the little man who wasn't there, and how they wish he'd go away.

Willkie is an incubus weighing on the party councils. Governor Dewey, the party's Presidential candidate, dislikes Willkie personally—Willkie heartily reciprocates his feeling—but yearns for a kind word of indorsement. Willkie's credo is anathema to the McCormicks, the Hoovers, and the Deweys. Willkie is the Republican Party's "that man." The party leadership will damn him if he does and damn him if he doesn't.

The question is: What will Willkie do?

At this writing, the 1940 Republican standard-bearer has avoided committing himself to the Dewey candidacy. On the day of the New York Governor's nomination, Willkie offered his congratulations, and Dewey sent a cold thank-you reply. Since then, there has been a batch of stories inspired by Dewey forces that Willkie is getting ready to come over. Minor appeasement offers have been made by Dewey, all ineffective. Willkie is interested in principles and platforms, not in prestige or personalities. A yarn that Clare Luce had conferred with Willkie on the possibilities of a negotiated peace between the two men was killed by Willkie's statement that he hadn't talked with Mrs. Luce in several months.

Four courses are open to Willkie: (1) he can indorse Dewey and participate actively in the campaign; (2) he can remain silent until the very last minute and tell inquiring reporters on Election Day that he voted for Dewey; (3) he can indorse F. D. R., whose fourth-term candidacy is a certainty, and campaign on his behalf; (4) he can withhold indorsement of either nominee and carry on a needling "educational" campaign in line with his own views. Unless some major concessions are made to his forthright stand on international cooperation,

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I doubt that Willkie will actively campaign for the Republican ticket.

His only two public statements since June 26 have been a criticism of the Republican Party's plank on international cooperation, which he implied was both meaningless and a phony, and a few words to show his irritation at the expulsion from the post of G. O. P. national treasurer of his friend and supporter Sinclair Weeks, and at the election as vice-chairman of Werner Schroeder, a disciple of the Colonel McCormick school of isolationism and misanthropy.

Privately Willkie has been more outspoken. He is reported to question the political integrity of Dewey, the firmness of his belief in anything except the narrow toryism of his supporters. Willkie has made it clear that his differences with the McCormick-Hoover-Dewey school are not on foreign policy alone but on domestic affairs as well—labor, treatment of minorities, price control.

Even a cursory reading of Willkie's articles published before the Republican convention will disclose how vast is the area of disagreement between him and Dewey. Max Lerner has described Willkie's philosophy as "creative conservatism." I would go farther and say that Willkie's philosophy is rapidly developing into a creative liberalism. Whether or not you think Willkie means what he says, it cannot be denied that he has spoken incisively and in the best liberal tradition.

In their present state of mind, Dewey and his advisers feel little need for Willkie's support, although, perversely, they'd love to have it. They know his backing may well mean the electoral votes of California, Oregon, Washington, and several of the New England states. Willkie's price is not a Cabinet post, or an ambassadorship, or some other plum. Willkie simply wants to drive the primitives who control the Republican Party out of power. To him, they menace the party's future, and, more important, they menace the possibility of genuine contributions to a better world order by the United States.

But Willkie is a politician as well as a maverick statesman. Though party regularity is not the shibboleth to him it is to the ward-heelers and precinct captains, it is a weighty consideration; it *must* weigh with a man who still dreams of achieving the Presidency.

Willkie's political future is, *faute de mieux*, entwined with the future of the Republican Party. The defeat of Dewey by Roosevelt would strengthen Willkie immeasurably. On the other hand, if Dewey should be elected, Willkie would be *kaput*. Dewey's victory would be interpreted as a repudiation of his rival's principles, and Willkie's importance in the Republican Party would become minimal. Willkie is of course aware of all this.

The most formidable problem which he faces is the need to make a decision in the near future. A protracted silence on his part can only weaken the importance of his ultimate choice. His war of nerves on Dewey and his cohorts may be irritating to Dewey, but it can also become boring to the average American voter. Essentially, Willkie has made his decision, even though it may be as subconscious as it is unspoken. The course of the campaign can only strengthen his mistrust of Dewey, no matter how far over Dewey goes to escape the McCormick millstone around his neck. If Willkie finally breaks his silence and indorses Dewey, it will be the most reluctant and insincere decision he ever made.

I know Willkie. Whatever his weaknesses, insincerity and pussyfooting are not among them.

# *In the Wind*

THE CREDIT GUIDE COMPANY of Marshalltown, Iowa, is circulating a "patriotic" leaflet advising all Americans to reject the "most sinister, dangerous, and revolutionary legislation ever introduced in the American Congress"—the Wagner-Dingell bill. "Do you want an 'OPA' to ration your medical care?" the company asks. "Do you want to wade through government red tape to secure medical supplies from some bureaucratic clerk who thinks in terms of cost rather than of your medical welfare? (Under similar systems, only those drugs listed by the government can be prescribed.)" The Credit Guide Company derives a good part of its income from collecting on overdue bills for Marshalltown doctors.

GOOD-NEIGHBOR NOTE: Some merchants in nearby nations, *Printer's Ink* reports, now advertise that their goods are *not* from Argentina.

COLUMNIST CEDRIC ADAMS, in the Minneapolis *Star Journal*, says that delegates, alternates, and speakers at the Republican convention were all schooled to make no mention of democracy. Republic is the word.

THE WASHINGTON *DAILY NEWS* sent six reporters with identical theoretical income-tax data to six different deputy collectors in the Revenue Building in Washington. They came back with six different answers. The returns were $17.39, $6.73, $12.15, $16.31, $12.20, and $16.77. Another reporter then went to the head of the department, who called in his super tax expert, who, after some time, emerged with what the chief said was the correct answer—$19.33.

ADVERTISEMENT IN THE *NEW YORKER:* In war as in peace McCall's is edited directly to the three primary interests of the American Woman—Her Heart, Her Home, Herself.

*FESTUNG EUROPA:* According to the Yearbook of the Bank of the International Settlements, Germany's foreign clearing debts for goods delivered up to September 30, 1943, reached 54,600 million marks. Creditors in order of rank were: France, 4,400 million; Holland, 4,010 million; Belgium, 3,845 million; the "Protectorate," 2,425 million; Italy, 2,000 million; Denmark, 1,890 million.

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# *Those Gentle Danes*

BY GUNNAR LEISTIKOW

IF THERE is any truth in reports from Stockholm, the Danes have won a major political and moral victory. The Germans must have suffered a tremendous loss of face in all occupied countries, for they acceded to Danish demands only after their threats to starve and bomb Copenhagen had failed completely to impress the strikers. Fantastic as this failure may seem to a world accustomed to Nazi ruthlessness, it is not entirely inexplicable if one reviews German actions in Denmark during the past ten months.

On August 29 of last year, when the Danes refused to make further concessions to the German will—to surrender Danish saboteurs to the mercy of German courts or to deliver Danish Jews to German executioners—the Nazis proclaimed a state of siege. They disarmed the Danish army after several days' fighting, dismissed the government, and made the king a virtual prisoner.

At that time everyone expected the Germans would carry out their threat to proclaim Denmark a "protectorate" and let the Gestapo rule it. But they did not. Instead they did their utmost to persuade the Danes to resume the administration of their own affairs. They went to the prisoner-King and asked him to appoint a new Cabinet, even one of his choosing. The King said that was impossible. In the first place, he was a prisoner; his hands were tied. In the second place, since he was a constitutional sovereign, he could not appoint a new government without accepting the resignation of the old—and by preventing the old government from functioning, the Germans had automatically deprived it of the power to resign.

All right, the Germans said, we shall see. They assembled, by force, the members of the old Cabinet and told them either to resign or to resume their functions. The ministers unanimously refused to do either. This, they said, is a meeting of Cabinet ministers, certainly, but it is not a Cabinet meeting because it has not been summoned in the proper way. The Prime Minister added that he was unable to summon a Cabinet meeting because the Germans prevented him from functioning by their extraordinary measures of August 29.

The Germans went to Parliament. Look here, they said, this is ridiculous. We want to play ball with you, and what does your government do but start a sitdown strike. Get another government, and we will be friends. The representatives of Parliament's five parties declared—unanimously—that Parliament still had full confidence in the old government. It was certainly not their fault that the Germans prevented it from functioning.

Exasperated, the Germans went back to the King. But he was a constitutional monarch, and he could do nothing against the advice of Parliament. The truth was that the Danish politicians were none too eager to assume further responsibility for what was happening in the country. They had actually felt a sense of relief when Danish autonomy was kicked overboard.

The Germans gave up. The Danes were given a good dose of the Gestapo. However, in comparison with the treatment accorded other German-occupied countries, they were handled gently: fewer shootings, fewer mass arrests, no interdiction of political parties or unions, no seizure of newspapers. The state and local administrations were allowed to function.

The Danish answer to even these half-hearted concessions was a wave of sabotage unequaled in any other occupied country. Two hundred acts of sabotage were reported in the last four months of 1943, ranging from wrecking of troop trains to destruction of well-guarded war plants—an average of fifteen to twenty cases a day in a country of less than four million inhabitants.

The Nazis answered in kind. If the Danes bombed factories, the Germans bombed crowded movie houses. If the Danes killed traitors, the Germans answered with the murder of well-known Danish patriots. To do the dirty work, they formed a special gang of a few thousand ruffians, the *Shalburgkorps,* named after a Danish Nazi who had fallen as a volunteer in Russia. This corps is advertised as a legion of Danish volunteers to fight bolshevism. Actually, it was commandeered from the German minority in North Slesvig, traditional Dane haters. After some toughening up at the eastern front, the corps was sent to Denmark on a "furlough."

Such is the background for the events which began on June 22 with the demolition by saboteurs of Denmark's largest machine-gun plant. The situation developed into a general strike when the Germans established martial law, made wholesale arrests of union leaders, and shot eight hostages. Unrest spread. Hundreds of people were killed. When the Germans shut off water and supplies and threatened to bomb Copenhagen, the Danes dared them to go ahead. The Nazis balked, as they had done the previous summer, apparently more jittery than their captives.

After August 29, 1943, the Danes interpreted the

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Germans' vacillation as a sign of weakness—which it probably was—and acted accordingly. They will hardly interpret German hesitancy differently this time.

# *Behind the Enemy Line*

BY ARGUS

IN THE official bulletins of the German army command the winged one-ton bombs which have been shot into southern England since June 16 are called simply "V-1" (*Vergeltungswaffe No. 1*)—without further explanation. The bombardment is described, quite undramatically, as "harassing fire" or occasionally as "retaliation fire." No more than a few short paragraphs a day are given to the whole affair. As so often in the last two years, the generals are making an unmistakable effort to keep their record free of breathless exaggerations and boastings. They leave that to Goebbels's department.

The ecstasies in which the Propaganda Minister indulges and which he seeks to arouse are all the more colossal. His method at first was to try to convince the public that it was already in a state of tremendous excitement and bliss about the new weapon. The *Nationalzeitung* of Essen, for example, published the following on June 17:

> Newspapers can always gauge the degree of interest evoked by a piece of news by the number of inquiries received at their office. Judged by this standard, we must assume that yesterday's High Command communiqué has aroused more interest than even the news of the Anglo-American invasion. On Friday afternoon our telephones were not silent for a moment. People kept asking excitedly whether the news was actually true.

A newspaper in Pommern declared:

> The German people intend to savor the new facts about the retaliation weapon to the very dregs, like a delicious nectar.

A paper in Central Germany went into raptures:

> Retribution has come! The tension which we have felt for so long has found its outlet. The tremendous pressure of the period of waiting has been relieved. Retribution has come for our murdered workers! Retribution for the travelers killed in trains! Retribution for the men, women, and children slaughtered in the fields and on the high roads! Retribution for many tens of thousands of injured civilians! Retribution for gutted German towns and villages! Retribution for gutted hospitals!

In the succeeding days one new device after another was used to whip up the people's feelings. Horrible names were coined for V-1—"dynamite meteors," "hell hounds," and the like. How "the enemy was seized by fear," and why, was dwelt on voluptuously:

> England is exposed to the hell hounds without any chance of adequate defense. The effect of the new weapon is tremendous, and it may be assumed that its impact on the people, as on the buildings, is many times greater than that of the heaviest Anglo-American terror bombs. (*Nationalzeitung*, Essen.)

The alleged groaning and whining of the English and their despairing appeals to German humanitarianism were ridiculed:

> We expect that either directly or through intermediaries appeals will soon be made to our notorious kindliness, but we have lost all such feeling. As long as there are English towns, we will remember that there is not much left of many of our towns. As long as there are tongues to cry for mercy, we will remember that our hatred must outlaw all compassion. Recalling what the British have done to us, we will not have the slightest pity if the number of Britons killed vastly exceeds our own casualties from bombings. Now the enemy knows that the threat of retaliation was not propaganda but reality. (*Münchener Neueste Nachrichten.*)

Still more violent and decisive surprises than the hell hounds were announced for the future. In a speech delivered in Leipzig on Gutenberg's anniversary State Secretary Neumann of the Propaganda Ministry said:

> The V-1 is doing its work. More weapons, even more effective, will follow. All this is only the beginning.

And of course he seized on the opportunity to boast that here was one more proof of the truth of every promise and every announcement of the Führer's:

> We have not forgotten the mocking smile of many compatriots when we spoke about revenge. Some people regarded us as deplorable fools who did not realize that the Führer promised revenge only to keep bombed-out people in check during terror raids. Now it is our turn to look around with a mocking smile. Just as his promise of revenge was redeemed by the Führer, so also will be his promise that the enemy in the midst of his invasion will suffer an annihilating defeat.

One wonders what has been the effect on the public of this superhuman propaganda effort. The Swiss correspondents have the impression that the trick has once again been successful. The correspondent of the *Appenzeller Zeitung* wrote on June 21 that the German people for the moment were "drunk with the glowing reports of the terrible effects of the hell hounds." A dispatch to the *Sankt Galler Tagblatt* of June 25 also spoke of the undoubted temporary effect on "the childishly gullible German public of the huffing, puffing, screaming hellish concert of propaganda." But the grim reality is bound soon to darken the glowing visions of approaching victory. Six days after the start of this new period of delirium, according to the *Basler Nationalzeitung*, an ironical inscription was chalked on the walls of buildings in Hanover:

> *Jetzt zieht man schon Grossmutter ein—*
> *Soll das wohl die Vergeltung sein?*
>
> (Now they are drafting even Grandma—
> Is that what they mean by retaliation?)

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# BOOKS and the ARTS

## Notes by the Way

IN "A Walk in the Sun" (Knopf, $2) Harry Brown has written a vignette of the landing of an American platoon on a beachhead in Italy. The platoon has been assigned the objective of occupying a farmhouse six miles inland and destroying a bridge that lies just beyond it. The lieutenant in command is killed in a freakish way before the men land; the sergeant who takes over is killed immediately afterward. A second sergeant goes to pieces when half the distance is covered—six miles can be very long—but the job is completed under the direction of a corporal. The men meet with no real resistance until they reach their objective, but several of them are wounded or killed by passing planes.

Mr. Brown gives us a vivid picture of the behavior of a group of men set down in a strange country to carry out an isolated assignment which tends to seem unreal and irrelevant. The dialogue is good and often funny. The "lines" and jokes in these passages are reminiscent of the artificial patter one hears over the radio, but they are probably authentic. I have the impression that American talk, when other people are listening and especially when the talkers are under a strain, tends to be more and more an imitation of the radio and movie imitations of American talk.

"A Walk in the Sun," like the action it describes, is a small marginal operation successfully carried out. But it reads like a case history rather than an imaginative evocation. Mr. Brown writes within what might be called the *New Yorker* convention. His prose is deft. It is also self-conscious and self-protective. His is a behavioristic account of war and death as it might be recorded by a telescopic camera with a sound track attached. The *New Yorker* convention is an effective one. It is also limited. The writer who is so constantly careful to keep his distance from his material, whose restraint is a matter of convention rather than of feeling, is not likely to produce first-rate fiction; by the same token he may well produce, as Mr. Brown has done, an expert and ingratiating facsimile.

For the other kind of restraint read Flaubert's A Simple Heart. It is almost enough to compare the two titles. The beautiful story of Félicité is on my mind because I have just read it again in the most recent edition of "Three Tales"—a volume in the New Classics Series (New Directions, $1). Harry Levin has written an introduction.

N. B.: I am poaching on Diana Trilling's fiction preserve because she is taking a brief vacation. She will resume her regular comment in a few weeks.

Bernard Shaw is recorded as having said that when people ask him what has happened in his long lifetime he does not refer them to the newspaper files or to the authorities but to Upton Sinclair's novels—the latest one is "Presidential Agent" (Viking Press, $3). Mr. Sinclair must certainly have the complete files of the New York *Times* or at least the Index at his elbow as he writes. His energy and goodwill are beyond dispute. So are his brashness and his naivete. And the uncomplicated, eager vulgarity with which he concocts bedroom scenes between his overworked robot, Lanny Budd, and President Roosevelt leaves me gasping.

> The President was lying in bed, wearing pajamas of blue pongee covered by a knitted blue sweater, crew-neck style. . . .
>
> So the two conspirators were alone. Lanny took the chair by the bedside, and the other coughed slightly and reached for his handkerchief. "I am supposed to have a cold," he said. "I am growing suspicious of my subconscious mechanism, for I notice that I develop the sniffles whenever I have a tiresome schedule like today."

Surely if Mr. Roosevelt reads this book he will have one, if not a hundred, of his most embarrassing moments.

Someone put forward the other day the common, always dubious argument that Mr. Sinclair's effort, while it may not be art, is nevertheless valuable. In this case the reasons given were that Mr. Sinclair is dispensing the accumulated knowledge of a long lifetime, that his point of view is "enlightened," and that a great many people will learn a lot about world affairs from the liberal point of view by reading his books. That assumes, in the first place, a capacity to put up with, let alone believe in, the peripatetic, ubiquitous, omniscient, and fatuous Lanny Budd which I for one don't possess. It also assumes the desirability of justifying everything that Roosevelt has done. I can't say I read the whole book, but what I did read of it was, among other things, a continuous apologetic for F. D. R. I'll take my history straight—though it should be said that any resemblance between this book and fiction is purely coincidental.

MARGARET MARSHALL

## Deadly Praise

*GIRAUD AND THE AFRICAN SCENE.* By G. Ward Price. The Macmillan Company. $3.

GENERAL GIRAUD faded out of the French picture so suddenly that this book, which came to praise Caesar, serves instead to bury him. It does this job effectively—so effectively, indeed, that anyone seeking to resurrect the General will find this literary tombstone a heavy obstacle. For it proves, unintentionally of course, that however brave a soldier Giraud may be, he lacks the savoir-faire which is indispensable to a political leader. The very fact that he gave this book his official authorization is eloquent: did he not know that G. Ward Price, bright star of the London *Daily Mail,* was distinguished chiefly for his pre-war eulogies of the fascist dictators?

Mr. Price has, of course, ceased to extol Hitler and Mussolini, but he still seems to find their ideas attractive and looks with an approving eye on those men in the United Nations camp who are tainted with them. Thus we find him extolling such unsavory figures as Lemaigre-Dubreuil, the peanut king of West Africa, who recently fled from Algiers to Spain.

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This notorious collaborationist is pictured as one of the heroes of the Allied landing in North Africa, although the most that can be said for him is that, having done well out of his business dealings with the Germans, he was smart enough to see the wisdom of reinsuring his profits with the Allies.

Mr. Price's account of the months immediately following the North African invasion skims lightly over the facts. He defends the policy of cooperation with the Pétainists on grounds of principle as well as expediency. He seeks to give the impression that only "Jews and Communists" supported De Gaulle and excuses the prolonged internment of the Spanish Loyalists—all "Communists" to him—and other anti-fascist prisoners.

Naturally Mr. Price is cool to the claims of the Committee of National Liberation to represent the French people and even goes so far as to imply that it has no influence within France. Frenchmen, he suggests, are likely to prefer, after liberation, a government headed by the almost forgotten President Lebrun, who could constitutionally summon a National Assembly composed of pre-1940 deputies and senators. Realizing, however, that such a solution would, in fact, be violently opposed, he hints that the Allied General Staff might seek to push General Giraud forward as a man "standing outside and above politics."

In a comparison meant to be flattering Mr. Price speaks of Giraud as a new Marshal MacMahon. After the defeat of 1870 MacMahon was elected to the Presidency by the Royalists, who hoped he would prepare the way for a restoration of the monarchy. "MacMahon's own instincts," says Mr. Price, "inclined him that way, but since it gradually became clear that the Republican Party was the strongest in the state, the Marshal's own sense of constitutional duty led him to resign his office." This quoted sentence represents British understatement at its worst. It pictures a conservative old soldier patriotically and gracefully submitting to the voice of the people, whereas MacMahon and his backers almost plunged France into civil war by their obstinate resistance to the mandate of the voters.

France does not want another MacMahon and will not thank Mr. Price for the offer. Yet we should perhaps be grateful for this book, which by its deadly praise may do more to kill the Giraud legend than a dozen deliberate exposures of it.

KEITH HUTCHISON

## How to Deal with Japan

*NIPPON: THE CRIME AND PUNISHMENT OF JAPAN.* By Willis Lamott. The John Day Company. $2.50.

SINCE Pearl Harbor the flood of books explaining how Japan "got that way" has given us the comfortable feeling that we now understand our enemy in the Pacific. This is an illusion. We don't really know so much about him, as Willis Lamott's thorough study of how the Japanese mind was molded during the thirties helps us to discover. For one thing, the language barrier is too difficult for more than a handful of Westerners to cross. We have never read Japanese fascist literature in its originals, nor even had a "Mein Kampf" in translation. It is significant that the only book comparable to the present volume in its intimate probing of the debasement of Japanese thought—D. C. Holtom's "Modern Japan and Shinto Nationalism"—was also written by a man who had mastered the language and entered into the arcana of Japan's fascist ideology. Nor is it an accident that both men were professionally interested in religion and were, by their work, brought into direct contact with the Japanese school and classroom.

A psychological barrier also exists. The peculiar essences distilled from emperor worship lie outside the range of our normal experience. To dismiss them with the epithet "fantastic" is to turn our back on the path to understanding and effective post-war remedial action. Japan's present rulers, in Lamott's striking metaphor, have created a nation that is "physically . . . as modern as a two-man submarine but mentally . . . neolithic." More descriptively, they have found "in a primitive and archaic tribalism the sanctions for life in industrial society and the motivation for world conquest." But neither metaphors nor summary generalizations are a substitute for the tracing out of these patterns of thought in detail and for a demonstration of how they were coercively imposed by every device of indoctrination against stubborn popular opposition through a decade of effort. And Mr. Lamott has done an invaluable job of interpretation in this succinct handbook of Nipponese ideology.

Lacking such a picture as his of the concrete reality, we have too often sought to piece out our thinking by resort to supposed parallels which do not in fact exist. Analogies between Nazism and Nipponism are deceptive. Japanese ideologists wield a more potent weapon than any in the Nazi armory. The ruling classes are the same in each case: the giant monopolists, the great landowners, the military caste. The ends sought are the same. But to attribute to Nipponism, as a tool of Japan's ruling oligarchy, the characteristics of Nazism is to water it down. The Führer, the party, even the German absolutist state, German blood and the German master race, are secular far more than mystical instruments and concepts. Against these set an "unbroken" line of god-emperors, "bodily, biologically . . . the State" and descended from the Sun Goddess, whose blood is shared through a different lineage by all members of the nation-family living in the God-favored land of Japan. On this foundation the finished ideological structure of Nipponism was reared during the past decade. The completed apologetics "boldly identifies the living emperor with the soul of God and the unifying life or spirit of the universe and asserts that the emperor is the earthly manifestation of the Sun Goddess, 'the progenitress of the whole cosmos.' To Japan, the divine land, under the leadership of the Son of Heaven, is intrusted the divine task of creating a universal family comprising all mankind and of chastising perverse nations impeding the carrying out of this celestial undertaking."

This is the context in which the "holy war" in China must be viewed, and likewise the creation of a benevolently ruled *kodo* (imperial way) state in Manchuria. Japan's synthetic fascist party naturally becomes the Imperial Rule Assistance Association. And the supremely effective all-embracing slogan of *hakko ichi-u* makes "universal brotherhood" synonymous with "universal sway of the emperor."

The centrality of the god-emperor in this ideology of

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conquest by a master race is the inescapable finding of Lamott's study, as it was of Holtom's. Subtract the emperor, and the whole edifice collapses; keep the emperor, and the liberal, democratic forces in Japan are saddled with an enormous handicap, even if the "moderates" form the first postwar government. For the so-called "moderates," representing the court circle, the business monopolists, and the great landowners, also want the god-emperor as a buttress to their privileged minority rule. To keep the emperor in this "stabilizing" function also means to keep him in his conquering mission. "No liberal reformer of Japan should be trusted," writes Lamott, "who hesitates to deal radically with the problem of the place and person of the ruler. It cannot be reiterated too often or too emphatically that since the ideas of racial superiority, world mission, and the perpetuity and world-wide extension of the imperial rule are so closely tied up in the sacrosanct figure of the emperor, Japan will always be a menace to the world so long as the garments of divinity are permitted to cling to this particular specimen of the *genus homo*. If this ghost is not exorcised at the outset, it will rise up to haunt future generations."

How is the ghost to be exorcised? Lamott charts the only thoroughly adequate course. First, there must be an overwhelming military defeat; Japan's fascist oligarchs have provided for every contingency except total defeat. Second, the resulting "disturbances . . . will be salutary," and should not be curbed. "Social chaos may determine the course of constitutional changes more definitely than outside interference, and here it is possible that an army of occupation may defeat its own ends by curbing popular uprisings out of which change will be forced and new leadership emerge." Third, a new "moderate" government formed by "political scene-shifting" should not be accepted lest it destroy the possibility of advance. "The only safe rule to go by is one that no government set up by the ruling classes of Japan in order to deal with the victors after the war can be trusted. . . . Constitutional government superimposed from above has been tried in Japan and has failed miserably, because no people is ever appreciative of rights and privileges for which it has not struggled, fought, and died." Fourth, popular initiative should be encouraged, even if the results are temporarily chaotic. "Indeed, it is foolsh to assume that any effective degree of democratic government can be achieved in Japan without such a surge from below. . . . The realization of social and political democracy in the future depends upon the achievement of popular self-consciousness and self-realization, which can come as the result of a social and political overturning of the extent that may be expected only after a disastrous and overwhelming defeat in war. The power of the demonic national ideology, moreover, cannot be broken by any 'tinkering with the works' but only when the authorities can no longer boast that Japan alone among the nations of the world has never had a revolution, and that social and political rights have been gained not by popular demand but by imperial benevolence."

T. A. BISSON

What makes RUSSIANS act like RUSSIANS?

RUSSIA
THEN AND ALWAYS

*By Nina Verhovskoy Hyde and Fillmore Hyde*

IN the new Russia of today, the old Russia of common land and cooperative effort survives and, in many ways, prevails. *Russia Then and Always* traces Russia's culture and traditions that are the heritage of the modern Russian and distinguish him from the modern American, Frenchman, or Englishman. It is a book that will enable Americans to understand the psychology, the beliefs and the prejudices of Russians today—and their role as a nation in the making of tomorrow. *Maps.* $3.00

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## A Memoir of Duffus

*THE INNOCENTS AT CEDRO: A MEMOIR OF THORSTEIN VEBLEN AND SOME OTHERS, WITH THE ADVICE AND CONSENT OF WILLIAM M. DUFFUS.* By R. L. Duffus. The Macmillan Company. $2.

IN THIS charming essay in nostalgia R. L. Duffus of the editorial staff of the New York *Times* has tried to seize two moments: his germinal twentieth year in the neighborhood of learning at Stanford University, and a sense of the emanation of Thorstein Veblen. He has succeeded in recreating the first, and we experience his internal confusions and his reaction to his father and elder brother, to an ailing and sophisticated graduate student, a Marx-quoting cook, and perhaps the greatest economist of the Western Hemisphere. This was the undomesticated personnel of the community which Veblen assembled in 1907 with bohemian spontaneity and brooded over with his wit and eloquent silences. Bound by no "cash nexus," the inhabitants of Cedro Cottage live at peace with nature and the domestic animals and at war with the surrounding world of capitalism and convention, which they calmly analyze and refashion after dinner and in spare minutes during the day. Mr. Duffus longs to return to Cedro; his evocation of it is a labor of love, and we share his affection for the callow youth who was father of the man.

Young Duffus was molded by Veblen in a way that was necessarily vague to him at the time and, alas, also to us now. His memories of the institutional economist, who is "this book's reason for being," are too discrete and few to bring him to life again. The great man appears mostly as the socio-economic system of Cedro, in short abstractly. A

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sage and morose Thoreau, he moves in limbo, disemboweling sacred dogmas, doubting natural laws, smiling at the supposed superiority of Occidental man over Oriental, of civilized over savage, and insisting that business thrives on waste. The undergraduate felt his fascination, but what of the influence, then or later? The social-mindedness of Duffus seems to be an inheritance from the family background rather than from the master. The one passionate outburst in this urbane essay is a defense of social security, and it is occasioned by the death of the father from an occupational disease. The author lays claim to two legacies from Veblen—a skepticism of accepted values and an appreciation of good workmanship. Skepticism was hardly peculiar to Veblen, and the emphasis on the importance of the instinct of workmanship is but one of the various factors of his attitude. Is it irrelevant to ask where in the New York *Times* is the Veblenian influence of this member of its editorial staff? It probably is, for "Cedro" is romantic memory with little significance for our understanding of Veblen or of the fate of his thought. SOLOMON F. BLOOM

## The Soviet Economy

*MANAGEMENT IN RUSSIAN INDUSTRY AND AGRICULTURE.* By Gregory Bienstock, Solomon M. Schwarz, and Aaron Yugow. Edited by Arthur Feiler and Jacob Marschak. Oxford University Press. $3.

*THE STRUCTURE OF SOVIET WAGES, A STUDY IN SOCIALIST ECONOMICS.* By Abram Bergson. Harvard University Press. $3.50.

IN 1944 James Burnham published a tract on the shape of things to come, predicting the emergence of a new class, the class of managers, whose rise to power he considered inevitable because they are becoming, he asserted, the real controllers of the means of production in the large industrial states. The Soviet Union, according to Burnham, already is a managerial state. Its rulers, he said, "are, of course, the men who are running its factories and mines and railroads, the directing members of the commissariats and subcommissariats of heavy and light industry and transportation and communication, the heads of the large collective farms."

Needless to say, Burnham's thesis was properly excoriated at the time by democrats and socialists alike. Its methodological weakness and political irresponsibility could fool only the naive. Now we finally have an empirical study of Soviet management whose overwhelming evidence obviates Burnham's categorical assertions in this uncertain area of sociological inquiry. The decisive characteristic of the Soviet economy is not managerial rule but overall planning under the political direction of the Communist Party. The individual manager is merely a cog in the gigantic wheel of socialist planning. The manager participates of course in the making of the plan, and he necessarily plays an important part in adjusting the plan in accordance with practice. But for all practical purposes he has only one outlet for his independent energies—namely, the reduction of real unit costs of production. With regard to output, expansion, wages, and prices he is subject to the dictates of the planners.

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*Former Eastern European Chief of, The Associated Press*

FROM the powder keg of Europe comes this expert newspaper man's explosive account of current history in the making. Must reading for every American who thinks he knows or who wants to know what manner of yeast is responsible for the constantly bubbling ferment in the Balkans. Robert Parker was with the German Army on its march into Poland in 1939; he saw Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria taken by the Nazis; he covered the Russian conquest of Bessarabia. His headquarters in Budapest was one of the best listening posts in Europe, and from the spring of 1942 up to a few months ago he was OWI Chief in Turkey. His thrilling personal adventures and reports of intrigue make Oppenheim read like Mother Goose. $3.00

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If earlier conflicts between managers and the Communist Party have been largely eliminated and the managers enjoy today a greater prestige than in the previous years of experimentation, this cannot be ascribed, as Burnham would have it, to managerial control of the means of production. It is rather due to the fact that most managers are party members. Already in 1936, 100 per cent of all chiefs of trusts, 97 per cent of all enterprise directors, and 82 per cent of all construction chiefs were Communists.

The Burnham thesis is tentatively supported by only one of the authors, Mr. Schwarz, whose hypothesis that Soviet managers might constitute the nucleus of a new ruling class was not found sufficiently borne out by facts in the opinion of the other authors. Inequality of educational opportunities would seem to be at the root of such a development. But as this inequality may be due to limitation of available state finances and the needs of war preparation rather than to a deliberate policy of fostering it, the hypothesis is open to question.

The study is not primarily concerned with the status of management at the present time, or rather at the outbreak of war in 1941, but traces the evolution of relations between managers, party, and trade-union committees. Nor is it exclusively concerned with management. It gives perspective to the particular problem of management by dealing with planning of industrial and agricultural production, banking controls, hiring and wage policies, procurement and sale, the questions of output, cost, price, and profit in the Soviet socialist economy.


WILLIAM L. SHIRER

*reveals:*

"I once urged Ambassador Dodd to pressure the State Dep't, or the Dep't of Commerce, or Pres. Roosevelt, or God—to get these reports published."




Douglas Miller blitzed Washington with his amazingly prophetic tip-offs when he was one of the unheeded few who saw at first-hand *why* "You Can't Do Business With Hitler." "VIA DIPLOMATIC POUCH", for the first time, breaks the secrecy which has hitherto concealed these, his confidential findings. "Actually," says Quentin Reynolds, "'VIA DIPLOMATIC POUCH' supplements all other books on Germany . . . The material is as new today as when Miller wrote it and even more timely."

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The almost simultaneous appearance of Mr. Bergson's careful study of Soviet wages is fortunate because the question of how Soviet wages are fixed is not fully answered in the management study. It will undoubtedly be seized upon by those who are anxious to prove that Russia has a non-socialist economy because of inequality of wages. It is to the author's credit, therefore, that he points out, as the full title of his book indicates, that wage inequalities are not contrary to socialist economics. Complete equality of income distribution as a criterion of socialism has been rejected by socialists ever since Karl Marx in his "Critique of the Gotha Program" (1875) suggested that in the earlier phases of socialism incomes might be determined on the basis of productivity.

If the Soviet planners found that wage scales, varying according to occupation, skill, and productivity, are necessary for maximum output and to avoid shortage of skilled labor and rapid labor turn-over, one may speak of "capitalist wages." But one cannot call Soviet economic institutions, wage structure included, "capitalist," as only recently the New York *Times* did in one of its most ill-informed editorials on what was alleged to be Russia's "new capitalism."

While the differential wage system distinguishes the Soviet economy from the ideal of communism rather than from competing economic systems, it is, as Mr. Bergson points out, socialist nevertheless for two reasons: first, the ownership and management of the greatest part of the country's industrial resources by the government; and, second, the direction and integration of this sector by a system of planning. Moreover, even if Soviet wages resemble capitalist wages with respect to inequality, Soviet profit is radically different from capitalist profit. It is the nature of profit, not of wages, which distinguishes the socialist from the capitalist system.

In the current epidemic of books on the Soviet Union these two scholarly studies are rare exceptions. Although limited in scope to particular problems, tentative in their conclusions, and frankly aware of the experimental nature of everything that goes on in Russia, they convey a more thorough "understanding" than the grandiose efforts of the so-called "interpretative" commentators in either the pro-Soviet or the anti-Soviet camp.

HEINZ H. F. EULAU

## Laws and Responsibilities

*THE COMING STRUGGLE FOR PEACE.* By André Visson. The Viking Press. $3.

THE title, inspired by John Strachey's challenge and prophecy "The Coming Struggle for Power," is not strictly accurate. This is not a work of political philosophy. Visson does not define "the coming struggle" in terms of a broad issue. The subtitle is far more to the point—Conflicting Forces and Aspirations Which the United Nations Will Have to Face. It is a case book, the clinical description of ailments which, as the author presents them, might have no connection whatever.

Let us accept it as such and be thankful. Even the conscientious and well-informed reader cannot keep in mind the morbid symptoms that torment forty separate nations.

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He will find them catalogued in these pages with two essential qualities of the reference book—lucidity and balance. Visson eschews the inevitable pedantry of the doctrinaire and the no less inevitable egotism of the correspondent: "Stalin told me . . ." He is fair, even in cases where fairness is almost a miracle, Russo-Polish relations, for example, or Zionism.

The very first virtue of a reference book is accuracy. Wherever I could check him, I found Visson reliable. This, however, applies only to the contemporary scene. His eyesight grows dim beyond the last decade. The First French Republic did not come in 1791, nor was the Third founded in 1871, after the Paris Commune. MacMahon was not in power "in the transition period between the Empire and the Third Republic (1871)." Boulanger did not "fall short of his political ambitions in 1892," but three years earlier; he committed suicide in 1891. The Entente Cordiale was signed in 1904, not in 1907. This is not carping: I appreciate the book, and should prefer to indorse it unreservedly. But a work of reference has to meet definite and exacting tests. Five dollars for an "Encyclopædia of World History" would be well invested.

The limits that André Visson set himself are rather hard to understand. He deals exclusively with the United Nations and a few neutrals. But the problems of Spain, Turkey, and Eire, for instance, are no less important to us than those of Sweden. He devotes much space to the Middle East and none to India. But Great Britain's policy in the eastern Mediterranean, Iraq, and Iran is still greatly affected by its desire not to sever connection with its Asiatic empire. Out of three hundred pages, less than eleven are given to the Far East: they might as well have been omitted. Above all, M. Visson plays Hamlet without the Prince: the problem of peace is the problem of Germany, which he leaves out altogether.

This is claimed to be "a book for diplomats, and in the years ahead every free man and woman on earth will be called upon to learn the laws and assume the responsibilities of diplomacy." Let me underscore two words—*laws* and *responsibilities*. Guiding principles do count; else we shall "muddle through somehow" into a third world war. The description of morbid symptoms, *per se*, will not lead to a diagnosis and a cure. The effect on the average American reader might be simply to revive isolationism: "These Europeans have always been fussing, and always will be. Let us stay at home and mind our own business." Such a book would be dangerous unless it were read in connection with Willkie's "One World." For the solidarity of nations is the first "law" to be mastered.

"Responsibilities": a durable peace will not depend on a purely empirical patching up between local factions, say Chetniks, Ustashi, and Partisans. It will depend on the solution of two great problems, each of which demands an act of will, that is to say, an act of faith. Will the United States choose world democracy, triple-headed imperialism, or isolation? Will Germany be integrated or caged? We must not, like Rousseau, "brush aside the facts." But the mere accumulation of unrelated facts, as in this valuable and intelligent compendium, throws absolutely no light on the fundamental issues.

ALBERT GUERARD

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# IN BRIEF

*THE VOICE OF NORWAY.* By Halvdan Koht and Sigmund Skard. Columbia University Press. $3.

Designed as a tribute to the unconquerable spirit of Norway, this book considers that nation's history and culture as a part of the heritage of mankind. Dr. Koht, former Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs, sketches his country's history as a twofold struggle, for national organization and for individual liberty—a manifestation of the true Nordic spirit as opposed to the Nazis' caricature of it. The second half of the book, by a former assistant professor of comparative literature at the University of Oslo, provides a spirited panorama of Norwegian letters. The reader is offered some delightfully fresh views of Holberg, Ibsen, and Bjornson, both as artists and as human beings. Agreeably free from the academicism and complacency which sometimes mar such national efforts at self-evaluation, "The Voice of Norway" is a truly stirring account of a people who have stood from earliest times for freedom under law.

*THE FRENCH COLONIES: PAST AND FUTURE.* By Jacques Stern. Didier. $3.

In 1939 France and its empire had a combined population of 110,000,000—larger than Japan's and almost as big as that of the United States. M. Stern, former French Minister of Colonies, makes out a case for the French Empire as a factor in the making of the peace. Particularly disturbed by Wendell Willkie's notion that the colonies must be given back to their inhabitants, M. Stern expatiates on French efforts at education, religious tolerance, and political equality among colonials. As a history of France's possessions and its attitude to them, the book is clear and informative. Nevertheless, the reader cannot but feel that M. Stern's reiterated implication that France's only stake in its colonies is a detached passion for their good, is simply a duplicate of the Pecksniffian attitude long held by another nation of imperialists, across the Channel.




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*McCARTHY OF WISCONSIN.* By Edward A. Fitzpatrick. Columbia University Press. $3.50.

As the author of the celebrated "Wisconsin Plan" (1912), Charles McCarthy wrote a dedication to that volume which Sandburg might have signed, and was himself a character to inspire Dos Passos. Dying early at forty-four, he had applied the kind of will to succeed that we facetiously associate with Horatio Alger's heroes to a wholly selfless, un-Alger-like struggle for social betterment. The son of poor Irish immigrants, McCarthy took a brilliant Ph.D. in history and became a powerful social engineer and instigator of intelligent experimental legislation in Wisconsin during the era of the senior La Follette. His major contribution was the Legislative Reference Library, which made authoritative sources of political and economic information readily available to Wisconsin lawgivers—a brilliant innovation at the time and an important adjunct to the democratic process. McCarthy won the recognition of Lord Bryce; he assisted both Wilson and Theodore Roosevelt in the drafting of their competing Presidential platforms. But he sought nothing for himself except to serve his nation. Colonel Fitzpatrick's book is a dignified, vigorous, and always readable introduction to the career of an enlightened and warm-hearted man who might well serve as a model for the American public servant.

*ONE HUNDRED GREAT YEARS.* The Story of the *Times-Picayune* from Its Founding to 1940. By Thomas Ewing Dabney. Louisiana State University Press. $4.

The New Orleans *Times-Picayune* came to the fore by its coverage of the Mexican War. Ever since, it has been one of the most influential of Southern newspapers. Mr. Dabney's book is not what his subtitle would lead us to expect, the story *of* the newspaper; he has forgone this to write the story *told* by the newspaper. In other words, this is not a contribution to the history of journalism, but simply one more backward-looking volume of the "Only Yesterday" type. Unfortunately Mr. Dabney lacks the lively touch needed to keep that kind of book rolling; nor does he possess the incisiveness or the selectivity of details required of the soberer historian. But for all that, this stout, incoherent volume is engaging to dip into, as the files of any long-established newspaper usually are.

# FILMS

IN Humphrey Jennings's "The Silent Village" Welsh miners movingly pretended that Germans had made a Lidice of their town. In Cavalcanti's "48 Hours" (from a story by Graham Greene) some very good professional and unprofessional actors pretend that disguised German parachutists try to capture a Gloucestershire village. The thing never seems really to have happened, as "The Silent Village" almost did; nor is the film the fanged masterpiece Hitchcock alone might have made it; but it falls on a very solid stool between. The village types are the sort of entomologically observed, remarkably lifelike, charming dolls which not only Greene but Coward and Waugh so often create instead of characters—a dear-old-boy rector, his passionate, constricted daughter, the merry, warm old woman who handles the switchboard and the mail, the robin-like lady of the manor, the marked-down Heathcliff who helps the Germans, etc., etc. Well written and directed and beautifully played, these characters are not to be scorned, even though they are the soberer, still self-satirizing and self-congratulatory grand-nieces and nephews of Gilbert and Sullivan; we have never yet managed to set up in films as good a portrait of an American small town, and there is poetic force in this puppetry though it lacks complexity and depth.

When men kill in this film they do it much more abruptly and simply than in ours; the reactions of women who kill or cause death—most of them have to use guile to get within striking distance—are seriously studied, and good and terrible to see. I only wish this cleavage by sex had not been as oversimple as knocking shale apart. I think the best of "48 Hours" is neither in its people nor, mainly, in their exciting, melodramatically plausible actions—aside from one gentle, marvelous, awful shot in which four cycling Home Guards oscillate and spill under machine-gun fire—but in its relating of the people and their actions to their homes, their town, their tender, lucid countryside. As the audience watches from a hill, with the eyes at once of a helpless outsider, a masked invader, and a still innocent defender, a mere crossroads imparts qualities of pity and terror which, to be sure, it always has, but which it seldom shows us except under tilted circumstances. And at moments,

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when the invaders prowlingly approach through the placid gardens of the barricaded manor in the neat morning light, the film has the sinister, freezing beauty of an Auden prophecy come true.

JAMES AGEE

# MUSIC

ONE of the college-age readers of this column who amaze me constantly with revelations of how much better musical understanding and taste —to say nothing of better all-around perception and sense—they have than I and my contemporaries had at the same age remarked recently in a letter: "The end of 'The Marriage of Figaro' has been running through my head. Just to think this music—without even whistling it—sends chills down my back. Whatever happens to me, I can reflect that my life hasn't been wholly lost: I have had the opportunity to know that opera, and that part of it in particular."

I have had thoughts of that kind myself in the last two or three years. In my case it is not merely that I have heard or seen certain things, but that I have lived long enough to perceive in them what I am able to perceive now. I have had this thought about pieces of music, about Toscanini's performances, about Markova's dancing. And one of the pieces of music, certainly, has been "The Marriage of Figaro." I got to know it well only when the Glyndebourne Festival recording was issued here, and found it marvelous then; but each time that I listened to it again after an interval I heard new marvels for the first time, while the old ones struck me with enlarged or fresh significance and greater impact; and I can reflect that whatever else has happened to me, I have had the luck to achieve the heightened awareness that enabled me most recently to hear in "Figaro" one of the supreme wonders that have been produced on this earth by human powers.

As with the whole so with the part—the passage that my correspondent wrote about. Its effect, like that of any such passage, comes partly from its context —where it is placed, what it follows. Three hours have been filled with the poignant sorrow of the Countess's *Porgi amor* and *Dove sono;* the longing of Susanna's *Deh vieni, non tardar;* the amused tenderness of her *Venite, inginocchiatevi;* the confused adolescent emotions of Cherubino's *Non so piu cosa son;* the ironic menace of Figaro's *Se vuol ballare;* the mock heroics of his *Non piu andrai;* the pompousness and malice of Bartolo's *La vendetta;* the earravishing loveliness of the Letter Duet; the humor and wit of the duets of Susanna and Figaro, Susanna and Marcellina, Susanna and the Count; the comedy of the first-act trio, the great finale of Act 2, the finale of Act 4. Three hours have been filled with the orchestra's running fire of gay, mocking, witty comment that has created the atmosphere of comedy in which even the serious things have happened. And this has continued to the very last: the music has exaggerated comically the pleas for forgiveness, the Count's stern refusals; and even in the hush of amazement and wonder produced by the Countess's entrance the violins have softly chattered their amusement. But then at last there has been an end to all this, and a moment's silence; and it is at this point, as the Count begins his *Contessa, perdono,* that we hear music which tells us of the sublimity of human forgiveness—music which, after what has come before, is overwhelming. And it becomes even more overwhelming—when it is taken up softly by the chorus, and when it is carried up to a point of superearthly religious exaltation. Then, in the silence which follows, solemn octaves of the strings gently ease us down to this earth again—and to the bustle and fanfares of the final curtain of the operatic comedy. The passage lasts only a couple of minutes; but those two or three minutes, coming after the three hours, create the most wonderful, most impressive moment that I can recall in opera.

It is almost as though Mozart had decided to correct the notion we might have of him as being capable only of what he had given us in the first three hours of "Figaro"—or for that matter what he had given in the slow movement of the Piano Concerto K.467 and in other astounding pages of other great works—and had taken a couple of minutes to make us realize that he could, when he chose, reveal spiritual insights equal to the greatest we have known. That was as much time as he needed for the demonstration; and once it had been made it didn't matter whether he made it again. Those insights were there, in addition to everything else that he communicated through the medium which he used as no once else has ever done; and that use of the medium and what he expressed through it made him the most extraordinary musical artist that ever lived.

B. H. HAGGIN

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# Letters to the Editors

## Make the FEPC Permanent

*Dear Sirs:* To those of us who were deeply involved in the struggle to insure continuance of the Fair Employment Practices Committee through Congressional approval of its appropriation for the next fiscal year it is clearly apparent that much of the credit for the favorable Senate vote of last week belongs to the many liberal forces throughout the nation which raised their voices in support of that agency. We know we speak for the millions of minority Americans when we say that by your splendid outspoken editorial of June 10 you contributed greatly to the cause of true democracy.

The FEPC has been granted its appropriation by Congress and has thereby received sanction and backing, but the fact remains that it is still handicapped by its lack of power to enforce its orders. Unless legislation is enacted to make it permanent, it will be abolished when the war ends and the problem of discrimination in employment becomes even more critical.

Awareness of the need for a permanent FEPC was indicated by the fact that even while the Senate was debating the advisability of continuing the present FEPC, the House Labor Committee was holding hearings on the Scanlon-Dawson-La Follette bill to give the FEPC permanent status and authority. Frustration and insecurity, it was demonstrated in these hearings, still haunt millions of minority-group Americans, for although they have made tremendous gains through employment in war industry, they have made practically no advance in any industry which is basic to the peace-time economy. Even when they are now employed, minority Americans, particularly Negroes and Latin Americans, are often denied full union rights, upgrading opportunities, and equal pay for equal work. Walter White, president of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, who had just returned from a tour of the war fronts, told the committee: "Wherever I went the question most frequently asked by Negro soldiers . . . was whether or not Negroes on returning home will continue to be confined to bootblack jobs." And in this country Negroes are already finding themselves the first to go as the cutbacks begin.

As the hearings progress and the people generally become aware of the issues involved in the proposed bill for a permanent FEPC, we hope for clarification of many existing misunderstandings. To the people of North, West, and Midwest one fact, which has already been brought out in the committee investigation, is highly significant. That is the fact that only 10 per cent of the closed cases reported by the present FEPC originated in the eight states of the deep South.

What will the post-war reconversion period mean to the industrial centers of the North, West, and Midwest, where 90 per cent of the cases handled by the present FEPC originated? Gunnar Myrdal in his "An American Dilemma" recalls that "after the [First World] war the homecoming Negro soldier met the suspicion and fears of the Southern whites. In the North their new footholds in industry were contested by anxious white job-seekers in the post-war depression. A wave of lynchings swept the South, and even more bloody race riots swept the North."

Dare we neglect to take every possible precaution to prevent a repetition after this war?

Already representatives of most of the outstanding national civic, church, and union organizations have appeared before the House Labor Committee to urge approval of the Scanlon-Dawson-La Follette bill; and on June 23 an identical bill was introduced in the Senate by a group of six Republican and Democratic Senators. This would indicate that we are justified in our belief that the overwhelming majority of Americans are conscious of the dangers of the post-war period and are looking to their government for leadership in protecting the economic rights of minorities.

ANNA ARNOLD HEDGEMAN
National Executive Secretary, National Council for a Permanent FEPC
Washington, D. C., July 3

## One Who Voted

*Dear Sirs:* I have just finished reading a letter signed M. S. and titled Can a Soldier Vote? in your issue of June 10. If Pvt. Polachek actually went through all the tribulations that your correspondent claims he did to cast his ballot, he has my sympathy. Personally, I don't believe a word of it. In contrast, I would like to set forth my experiences with absentee voting in California.

I was sitting in my office one day—everyone in the Coast Guard has his own private office—when another sailor came in and asked me if I cared to vote. Naturally, I answered in the affirmative, and he handed me an application for an absentee ballot. I filled it out in my own inimitable scrawl and sent it to the Secretary of State of California.

From the time I sent in my application until the time I received my ballot, an interim of three weeks, I never once stirred from my office, except for an occasional meal and a cup of grog. When the ballot arrived, I ripped open the envelope, whipped out my pen, and cast my vote in the Democratic primary.

My next step was to get an officer to sign my ballot. At the exact time I desired the presence of an officer, a short ensign walked by. He was my man. I called him in, told him what I wanted, and handed him my pen. He was neither reluctant nor angry with me because I wished to exercise my right to vote. As a matter of fact, the ensign and I had quite a long political discussion. He told me he was voting for Landon, and I assured him he couldn't win. We parted the best of friends. I dropped my ballot in the nearest mailbox, then returned to my office, where I plan to sleep until the November elections, when I will again corner the short ensign.

YEOMAN
Somewhere in California, June 28

## CONTRIBUTORS

JOSEPH CHAPIRO was for many years a contributor to the democratic press in Austria and German correspondent for French papers. He has written two books: "Les Origines de la Grande Guerre" and "Der Arme Villon."

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# Cross-Word Puzzle No. 72

By JACK BARRETT



## ACROSS

1 Leading actor's dressing-room? (hyphen, 4-7)
9 What size of paper would you use to make a jester's hat?
10 One stage of a salmon's existence
11 The answer makes clear why it is called the "funny bone"!
12 Produce a drawing from a container with nothing in it!
14 Same again!
15 Beer tray (anag.)
17 Such employment requires shifts to maintain production (hyphen, 4-4)
20 Fled from Apollo and was, at her own request, turned into a laurel tree
22 His opera *Salome* has provoked much discussion
24 Situation from which there is no prospect of escape
26 Ladies, like soldiers, should keep it dry
27 An additional safeguard to one's understanding
28 Spares trees (anag.)

## DOWN

2 Bill's voluble exit (hyphen, 6-3)
3 He lives a retired life, but shows purpose in the end
4 "---- tells a flattering tale, Delusive, vain and hollow. Ah! let not ---- prevail, Lest disappointment follow"
5 He travels to and fro by season
6 Civet (anag.)
7 Troops in formation before a public building?
8 Where Jack spends his leave
13 A place once reared by monk and priest; a tar and bigwig of the East
16 One who values property (Who doesn't?)
18 What! No Act I? What a performance!
19 Puts in, with or without the fifth letter
20 Father and offspring in a Dickens' novel
21 He took a prominent part in the Trojan War, and was extolled by Homer
23 Dared to be venomous
25 This sort of fountain doesn't play in Washington Square

### SOLUTION TO PUZZLE No. 71

ACROSS:—1 FATHER; 5 ALMANAC; 10 SCOUNDREL; 11 RARER; 12 ITERANT; 13 ANYWISE; 14 OMENS; 16 NEPOTISTS; 18 CALIPHATE; 20 GUSTO; 22 HUNDRED; 24 SEAKALE; 26 RHINE; 27 VERDIGRIS; 28 STEPSON; 29 STRING.

DOWN:—2 ATONE; 3 HANGARS; 4 RURITANIA; 5 AILSA; 6 MARRYAT; 7 NARCISSUS; 8 CARVER'S; 9 ESKIMO; 15 EGLANTINE; 17 PLEASURES; 18 COHERES; 19 PERSEUS; 20 GLAZIER; 21 ODESSA; 23 DIVAN; 25 AKRON.


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